North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Le cadre européen de protection des données personnelles en matière pénale. Dimensions interne et externe = The European framework for the protection of personal data in criminal matters. Internal and external dimensions. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 29, May 2013

No abstract.

The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice area? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 74, December 2014

This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.

The EU, China and Southeast Asia: Divergent Views of Dealing with Human Security. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 8, May 2014

Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

Irregular Migration, Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU. CEPS Paperback, 22 February 2016

The expert contributors to this edited volume, representing a multidisciplinary selection of academics, examine the treatment of irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling in EU law and policy. The various chapters explore the policy dilemmas encountered in efforts to criminalise irregular migration and humanitarian assistance to irregular immigrants. The book aims to provide academic input to informed policy-making in the next phase of the European Agenda on Migration. In his Foreword, Matthias Ruete, Director General of DG Home Affairs of the European Commission, writes: “This initiative aims to stimulate evidence-based policy-making and to bring fresh thinking to develop more effective policies. The European Commission welcomes the valuable contribution of this initiative to help close the wide gap in our knowledge about the smuggling of migrants, and especially the functioning of smuggling networks.”

Who will monitor the spies? CEPS Commentary, 8 January 2014

A majority of national governments across the EU have long tried to cordon off their practices of mass interception of communications data and cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts, arguing that they remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’ on grounds of national security. In light of the revelations that some EU member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) are running their own secret interception programmes, however, the question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. This commentary, by a team of JHA specialists at CEPS, offers four important legal reasons why the covert surveillance programmes of member states should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of EU intervention.

Russian sanctions against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential. OSW COMMENTARY No. 152, 2014-11-06

Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

The UN General Assembly Resolution on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings - an Example for Europe. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/04 • May 2013

Summary. The EU’s attempts to adopt an EU-wide instrument on the right to access to legal aid in criminal proceedings have not been successful so far. The important issue was originally part of Measure C of the Roadmap for criminal procedural rights,1 but due to political difficulties legal aid was dropped from the agenda. However, on a different plane agreement was reached on this topic as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted the world’s first international instrument dedicated to access to legal aid in December 2012.2 This policy brief argues that the EU should carry on in the ‘spirit’ of these recent developments and adopt a directive providing suspects and defendants with access to legal aid. 1 Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4 December 2009; hereafter will be referred to this Council Resolution as the ‘Roadmap’; for further information see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings’, 4 EUCrim (2009), 157-161. 2 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, A/Res/67/187, 20 December 2012; from here on will be referred to this as the ‘Resolution’.

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

Prostitution as a Human Right: an Oxymoron. European Policy Briefs No. 36, August 2015

Prostitution is an extremely contentious topic, for political forces as well as civil society. The recent position adopted by Amnesty International in favour of a full decriminalization of this activity is an opportunity to launch a critical debate on this issue, at the global and European levels. Because of its close connections with human trafficking and migration, prostitution is indeed an inherently trans-national phenomenon requiring solutions beyond the strictly national level. This policy brief summarizes the main arguments of the debate and outlines a few alternative propositions.

The Importance of Foreign Language Skills in the Labour Markets of Central and Eastern Europe: An assessment based on data from online job portals. CEPS Special Report No. 129/January 2016

In a globalised world, knowledge of foreign languages is an important skill. Especially in Europe, with its 24 official languages and its countless regional and minority languages, foreign language skills are a key asset in the labour market. Earlier research shows that over half of the EU27 population is able to speak at least one foreign language, but there is substantial national variation. This study is devoted to a group of countries known as the Visegrad Four, which comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Although the supply of foreign language skills in these countries appears to be well-documented, less is known about the demand side. In this study, we therefore examine the demand for foreign language skills on the Visegrad labour markets, using information extracted from online job portals. We find that English is the most requested foreign language in the region, and the demand for English language skills appears to go up as occupations become increasingly complex. Despite the cultural, historical and economic ties with their German-speaking neighbours, German is the second-most-in-demand foreign language in the region. Interestingly, in this case there is no clear link with the complexity of an occupation. Other languages, such as French, Spanish and Russian, are hardly requested. These findings have important policy implications with regards to the education and training offered in schools, universities and job centres.