Member State BITS after the Treaty of Lisbon: solid foundation or first victims of EU investment policy? Research Paper in Law, 02/2012

[Introduction.] This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on the basis of the proposed Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries presented by the Commission on 7 July 20101 and the European Parliament’s Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.2 The proposed Regulation and the Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the development of an EU international investment policy”.3 The first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief introduction of the notion of investment law and the scope of the EU’s new investment competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

A Critique of Kosovo’s Internationalized Constitutional Court. EDAP 2014/02

The quality and the sustainability of the democratic institutions established in post-independence Kosovo under the guidance of the international community depend to a large extent on the performance of its constitutional court. The considerable international investment in that court reflects this assessment. One of the reasons why Kosovo’s international supervision has recently been terminated is that such court has been deemed to be functioning well. But its performance has not yet adequately been scrutinized. This essay reviews its most significant judgments, including decisions that deposed a president, annulled a presidential election, prevented a general election, and abolished the inviolability of parliament. The analysis of the reasons and effects of such rulings leads to the conclusion that the court gravely lacks independence and is subject to heavy political interference, which also the international judges do not seem immune from. The performance of the court is both a manifestation and a cause of Kosovo’s acute governance problems, which its international supervision has failed to remedy. The international community’s approach towards the court is also an illustration of the reasons why statebuilding in Kosovo led to unsatisfactory results, despite unprecedented investment.

Are Germans wasting their savings abroad? CEPS Commentary, 7 April 2016

Germany is running a current account surplus of about 8% of GDP, which means that about one-third of all German savings (equal to 24% of GDP) has to be invested abroad every year. It has become by now almost a cliché that these huge excess savings are being wasted abroad. But this is a popular misconception based on the divergence between the available data on the (cumulated) current account balance (cCAB) of Germany and its net international investment position (NIIP). A closer look at the data actually suggests that the NIIP is probably not measured correctly and that the observed returns on German investment abroad have remained above most domestic returns.

Will the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership be a game-changer? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 5, April 2013

In February 2013, US President Barrack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso announced the decision to go for an ambitious and comprehensive trade and investment agreement between the US and the EU. To be called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this agreement would lead to a new stage in the transatlantic relationship and be a much needed boost to the lacklustre economic recovery so far. Some analysts have even argued that TTIP would be a “game changer” – besides the economic gains, it would serve a bigger strategic purpose of promoting EU-US common objective to set higher standards of trade liberalisation, and thereby level the playing field in China and other key emerging markets. This policy brief examines the reasons behind the current push towards TTIP and the possible contents of such an agreement. It also discusses the possible obstacles to the realisation of TTIP, and at the same time, looks into what a successful conclusion of TTIP would mean for Asia and beyond.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A long hard road to multilateralism? EPC Commentary, 26 September 2014

The seventh round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the European Union and the United States will take place in Washington on 29 September. If concluded successfully, the TTIP would become the world’s largest free trade pact. The EU and the US account for nearly half of the world’s GDP and 30% of world trade with exchanges of goods and services worth around €723 billion a year and €1.8 billion a day. The Partnership, unprecedented in its scope and ambition, has generated great expectations which will be hard to meet in reality. It could however have a beneficial effect on trade multilateralism, provided that it is the result of an open negotiating process.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007

The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of the high-tech sector. The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel.

Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."