A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

The Italian Parliament and the EU: a slow and gradual Europeanization. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

In this paper we discussed how the literature traces a growing involvement of the national parliaments in EU policy-making. Three phases can be distinguished: limited or no involvement was the trend until the 1980s; after the Single Act (SEA, 1987), national parliaments started to be interested in European affairs and to set up specialized committees; following the Maastricht Treaty (TUE, 1992), the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs became a response to the question of "democratic deficit" in the EU (Norton, 1995). The growing number of policies dealt with at the EU level, the consequently increased influence of EU law in national legislations, the new powers of the Union: all of these worked together to push national legislators to seek a scrutiny role in the drafting of EU legislation. According to Laprat (1995: 1), once the TUE was formally approved, a more parliamentary climate prevailed. In more recent years, national parliaments have distinguished themselves for their increased role in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Raunio and Hix, 200I: !52); more specialized MPs sit in the committees on EU affairs; the amount of work for EU specialists has increased. Also, parliamentary scrutiny, initially only optional and ex post, is now increasingly ex ante and/or mandatory (Maurer and Wessels, 2001: 425-475).

Smart electricity grids: A very slow deployment in the EU. Egmont Paper No. 74, February 2015

Summary. The European electricity sector will have to deal with a huge challenge in the decades to come. On the one hand, electrical power is increasingly substituted for other forms of energy. It has been forecast that electricity demand will increase in the future (notably because of new needs in transport and heat sectors), although it is currently stagnant, mainly because of the economic crisis. Unless a major alternative energy source is discovered, electricity will become the central energy pillar in the long term. On the other hand, electricity production remains uncertain and will depend on numerous factors: the growth of renewable energy and decentralized energy, the renewal of old power generation capacities, increased external dependency, CO2 charges, etc. This increases the demand for electricity networks that are more reliable, more efficient, and more flexible. Europe’s current electricity networks are ageing, and, as already indicated by the International Energy Agency, many of them will need to be modernized or replaced in the decades to come. Finally, the growing impact of energy trading also needs to be taken into account. These considerations explain the need to modernize the electric grid through various ICT means. This modernization alone may allow the grid to become more flexible and interactive, to provide real time feedback, more adaptation to a fluctuating demand, and finally to reduce the global electricity costs. The paper begins with a description of the EU definition of the term ‘smart grid’ (§ 1) and of the body in charge of advising the Commission (§ 2). The EU legal framework applicable to smart grids is also detailed (§ 3). It is a rather complex domain, connected to various regulations. The paper then examines three critical factors in the development of smart grids (and smart meters as a precondition). Standardization is quite complex, but absolutely essential (§ 4). Innovation is not easily put into action (§ 5). Finally, as digital insecurity has worsened dramatically in recent years, the security of electricity networks, and especially their multiplied electronic components, will become increasingly important (§ 6). Lastly, the paper provides a concise overview of the progress of smart grids in the EU in recent years (§ 7). In a nutshell, the conclusion is that progress is quite slow, many obstacles remain, and, given the appearance of many new regulatory problems, it would be useful to organize a review of the present EU strategy.