Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives��� superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.

Too high and too low: The problems with energy prices in the EU. OSW Commentary No. 122, 03.12.2013

On 11 October, the top executives of ten European energy companies, which jointly own about half of the European Union’s electricity generating capacity, warned that “energy security is no longer guaranteed” and once again called for changes to EU energy policy. Due to persistent adverse conditions in the energy market (linked to, for example, the exceptionally low wholesale energy prices) more and more conventional power plants are being closed down. According to sector representatives, this could lead to energy shortages being seen as early as this winter. Meanwhile, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph published in September of this year, the European industry commissioner Antonio Tajani warned – in a rather alarmist tone – of the disastrous consequences the rising energy prices could have on European industry. Amongst the reasons for the high prices of energy, Tajani mentioned the overambitious pace and methods used to increase the share of renewables in the sector. In a similar vein, EU President Herman Van Rompuy has highlighted the need to reduce energy costs as a top priority for EU energy policy1. The price of energy has become one of the central issues in the current EU energy debate. The high consumer price of energy – which has been rising steadily over the past several years – poses a serious challenge to both household and industrial users. Meanwhile, the declining wholesale prices are affecting the cost-effectiveness of energy production and the profits of energy companies. The current difficulties, however, are first and foremost a symptom of much wider problems related to the functioning of both the EU energy market as well as to the EU’s climate and energy policies.

Development of Multisector Alliances (MSAs): Organization and Leadership. ACES Working Papers, 2012

The research team reviewed numerous several multi- sectoral entities and identified nine GGNs that became the subject of our case studies. The research team conducted semi-structured interviews with executives and staff from each of these GNNs and prepared a profile, including a description of the unique evolution of the organization, goals and objectives, organizational structure and governance arrangements for each GGN. The following list provides an overview of the nine GGNs profiled: 1. Every Woman Every Child is an unprecedented global effort that mobilizes and amplifies action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector, research centers, academia and civil society to address life-threatening health challenges facing women and children globally. 2. HERproject catalyzes global partnerships and local Networks to improve female workers’ general and reproductive health in eight emerging economies. 3. R4 Rural Resilience Initiative is a cutting-edge, strategic, large-scale partnership between the public and private sectors to innovate and develop better tools to help the world’s most vulnerable people build resilient livelihoods. 4. Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations that aims to improve transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. 5. Global Network for Neglected Tropical Diseases works with international partners at the highest level of government, business and society to break down the logistical and financial barriers to delivering existing treatments for the seven most common neglected tropical diseases. 6. Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition is an alliance that supports public-private partnerships to increase access to the missing nutrients in diets necessary for people, communities and economies to be stronger and healthier. 7. Inter-Agency Network For Education in Emergencies is a global Network of individuals and representatives from NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools and affected populations working to ensure all persons have the right to a quality and safe education in emergencies and post- crisis recovery. 8. mHealth Alliance works with diverse partners to advance mobile-based or mobile-enhanced solutions that deliver health through research, advocacy, support for the development of interoperable solutions and sustainable deployment models. 9. The Rainforest Alliance is a global non-profit that focuses on environmental conservation and sustainable development and works through collaborative partnerships with various stakeholders.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.