Fiscal rules: timing is everything. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02, September 2012

The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances.

Reaching for a Calculator or a Mirror? Why the EU Joins International Human Rights Treaties. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2013

Why does the European Union (EU) join international human rights treaties? This paper develops motivational profiles pertaining either to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ or a ‘logic of consequentialism’ in order to answer this question. It compares the EU’s motivations for its recent accession to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) with those dominating the EU’s nonaccession to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Based on this cross-case analysis, I argue that the EU’s accession decisions are best viewed as cost-benefit calculations and explained by the strength of opposition and the desire to spread its norms. The EU is only marginally concerned with efforts to construct an ‘appropriate role’, although its accession considerations are positively influenced by (varying degrees) of an internalized commitment to human rights. The paper aims at deepening the understanding of the EU’s motivations in the paradigmatic hard case of accession to international human rights treaties not least to evaluate the EU’s ‘exceptional nature’, facilitate its predictability for stake-holders and contribute to political and ethical debates surrounding future rites of passage as a global actor.

Carbon leakage: an overview. CEPS Special Report No. 79, 6 December 2013

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on climate policy, given the confluence of issues that are currently being debated, including the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the review of the EU carbon leakage list by 2014. Carbon leakage is the result of asymmetrical carbon policies, especially carbon pricing, and the resulting carbon cost, which affects the international competitive position of some EU industry and could displace production and/or investment, and the emissions of the activities displaced. This paper identifies the difference between carbon price and carbon cost to leakage exposed industry as one of two fundamental issues to be understood and addressed; lack of visibility on future climate policies and anti-leakage provisions is the other key issue. While this is a global issue, most of the experience has been accumulated in the EU. Carbon leakage is only one of the factors that could affect the competitive position of sectors, but it is difficult to attribute the impact of carbon costs versus other variables such as energy costs, labour, etc. Studies have predicted the risk of a significant amount of production leakage in a number of energy-intensive industries. To address the danger, they were included in the EU ETS carbon leakage list, which gave them access to free allowances. However, a limited number of studies undertaken after the end of the second trading period (2012) show little evidence of production leakage and asks the question whether the issue has not been blown out of proportion. The paper argues that the past may not be a good representation of the future, as it was heavily influenced by a high level of free allocation, the exceptional economic downturn, CO2 prices significantly below what was anticipated, as well as the potential for changes in some fundamental variables such as the shrinking pool of allowances available for free allocation. It emphasises the need for a well-informed debate in the EU on measures to address carbon leakage post-2020, underpinned by a number of options, and objective criteria to evaluate those options. It emphasises that the debate should cover both investment and production leakage, caused by both direct and indirect carbon costs.