The Relevance of International Spillovers and Asymmetric Effects in the Taylor Rule. CEPS Working Document No. 403, February 2015

Deviations of policy interest rates from the levels implied by the Taylor rule have been persistent before the financial crisis and increased especially after the turn of the century. Compared to the Taylor benchmark, policy rates were often too low. This paper provides evidence that both international spillovers, for instance international dependencies in the interest rate-setting of central banks, and nonlinear reaction patterns can offer a more realistic specification of the Taylor rule in the main industrial countries. The inclusion of international spillovers and, even more, nonlinear dynamics improves the explanatory power of standard Taylor reaction functions. Deviations from Taylor rates tend to be smaller and their negative trend can be eliminated.

In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/02, February 2014

The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.

Cyclical dimensions of labour mobility after EU enlargement. Bruegel Working Paper 2009/03, May 2009

At a time of symmetric global slowdown, migration cannot contribute as much to absorbing economic shocks as it could if the shock were asymmetric. • Early evidence suggests that the crisis has led to a drop in immigration and even net return migration from some countries. This has helped the adjustment of former EU15 host countries and has exacerbated adjustment in former source countries in the new member states. In the short run, the stock of new member-state migrants in the EU15 will fall owing to diminished job opportunities for migrants. • Changes in the unemployment rate in the host country are found to impact migration more than that of changes in the unemployment rate in the source country. In part, this can be explained by the disproportionate risk of migrants losing their jobs in the downturn. • In the longer run, the crisis is set to increase migration from the new member states compared to what would have been the case without the crisis. This is because the crisis has undermined the economic growth model of those new member states that relied heavily on external financing to fuel their growth.

Die Europäische Union und das Rahmenübereinkommen zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten: ignorieren, parallell “umsetzen“ oder gar beitreten? = The European Union and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: ignore, "implement" or even join? EDAP Paper 04/2014

This paper looks at the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) through the lense of European Union law. It does so by posing four major questions: does the fact that 24 of 28 Member States of the EU ratified the FCNM have any legal implications for the European Union itself? Secondly, turning to the national level, does it make a difference for the implementation of the FCNM whether or not a state that has ratified the FCNM is also a member to the European Union? Thirdly, returning to the European Union itself, can and should the EU accede to the FCNM? Or are there, finally, any means beside ratification that would allow the European Union to implement the objectives and obligations as enshrined in the FCNM? These four questions are analysed in detail before the paper concludes on the potential role of the European Union in managing diversity and protecting (persons belonging to) minorities.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Don’t complicate it even further: Macroeconomic Conditionality as a Substitute for new Structural Reform Contracts. European Policy Brief No. 15, May 2013

The idea of introducing contracts between Member States and the EU on structural reforms has its merits, it also has several disadvantages. Most notably, the contracts risk rendering European economic governance even more complex and cumbersome. It is therefore sensible to first try to integrate the structural reform contracts into one of the foreseen economic governance instruments. This Policy Brief argues that macroeconomic conditionality can serve this purpose. With some minor reforms, it could even become a full-fledged substitute for structural reform contracts – without suffering some of latter’s disadvantages.