The creation of euro area financial safety nets. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/09, July 2012

The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for countries to adjust. The euro area has developed several such mechanisms over the last couple of years through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. Their overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities. This paper provides an overview of the recent financial stability mechanisms and their various shortcomings and tries to brush the outline of a more comprehensive safety net architecture that would coherently address the banking, sovereign and external imbalances crises against both transitory and more permanent shocks. It aims to provide a roadmap for further improvements of the current mechanism and the creation of new devices including a banking resolution mechanism and amore powerfulmechanismto provide financial assistance addressing both the sovereign and external dimensions of the shocks thereby reducing the need for the ECB to fill the current void.

The policy mix and macroeconomic adjustment in the Euro area. CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2012

Against the background of the IMF’s latest global economic forecast, Jørgen Mortensen and Cinzia Alcidi raise questions in a new CEPS Commentary about the timing of the implementation and the effects of the three main categories of economic policy – fiscal, monetary and structural.

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/06, 13 March 2013

Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision,avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment. Bruegel Blueprint [No. 19?], 16 May 2013

Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.

Sovereign debt and its restructuring framework in the Euro area. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/05, August 2013

To compensate for the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, the euro area needs flexibility through a system of orderly debt restructuring. With virtually no room for macroeconomic manoeuvring since the crisis onset, fiscal austerity has been the main instrument for achieving reductions in public debt levels; but because austerity also weakens growth, public debt ratios have barely budged. Austerity has also implied continued high private debt ratios. And these debt burdens have perpetuated economic stasis. Economic theory,history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt restructuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the principle to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.

Framing Banking Union in the Euro Area: Some empirical evidence. CEPS Working Document No. 389, 3 February 2014

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area is retrenching at a quicker pace than outside the union. Home bias persists: Governments compete on funding costs by supporting ‘their’ banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feeds the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies friction in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. This paper discusses the theoretical foundations of a banking union in a common currency area and the legal and economic aspects of EU responses. As a result, two remedies are proposed to deal with moral hazard in a common currency area: a common (unlimited) financial backstop to a privately funded recapitalisation/resolution fund and a blanket prohibition on state aids.

Implementation of the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes in the Euro Area: State-of-Play. CEPS E-Book, 11 March 2014

Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes – in Portugal and Ireland – can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.

Exports and Capacity Constraints: A smooth transition regression model for six euro-area countries. CEPS Working Document No. 395/May 2014

The significant gains in export market shares made in a number of vulnerable euro-area crisis countries have not been accompanied by an appropriate improvement in price competitiveness. This paper argues that, under certain conditions, firms consider export activity as a substitute for serving domestic demand. The strength of the link between domestic demand and exports is dependent on capacity constraints. Our econometric model for six euro-area countries suggests domestic demand pressure and capacity-constraint restrictions as additional variables of a properly specified export equation. As an innovation to the literature, we assess the empirical significance through the logistic and the exponential variant of the non-linear smooth transition regression model. We find that domestic demand developments are relevant for the short-run dynamics of exports in particular during more extreme stages of the business cycle. A strong substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales can most clearly be found for Spain, Portugal and Italy, providing evidence of the importance of sunk costs and hysteresis in international trade.

Fighting Deflation: Would QE work in the euro area? CEPS Commentary, 9 October 2014

With inflation in the eurozone stubbornly remaining on a downward trajectory, pressure is growing on the ECB to do “something” to prevent outright deflation. But, given the financial structure of eurozone countries, would the preferred "something" – quantitative easing – actually do the trick?

Does Money Matter in the Euro area? Evidence from a new Divisia Index. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/12, 6 November 2014

The purpose of this paper is to examine the possible role of money shocks on output and prices in the euro area. Since no Divisia monetary aggregates are available for the euro area, we first create and make available a database on euro-area Divisia monetary aggregates. We plan to update the dataset in the future and keep it publicly available. Using different SVAR models, we find sensible and statistically significant responses to Divisia money shocks, while the responses to simple-sum measures of money and interest rates are not statistically significant, and sometimes even the point estimates are not sensible.

Investment as the key to recovery in the euro area? CEPS Policy Brief No. 326, 18 November 2014

Investment has declined in the euro area since the start of the economic and financial crisis, but this does not mean that there is necessarily an ‘investment gap’, explains Daniel Gros in this CEPS Policy Brief. Investment was probably above a sustainable level due to the credit boom before 2007. Moreover, the fall in the euro area’s potential growth − due to a combination of a sharp demographic slowdown and lower total factor productivity (TFP) growth − should also lead to a permanently lower investment rate. Increasing the investment rate might thus be the wrong target for economic policy. The author advises that the aim of economic policy should be to increase consumption, rather than investment overall. Increasing infrastructure investment might be justified in some member countries, but it is not a ‘free lunch’ when efficiency levels are low, which seems to be the case in some of the financially stressed euro area countries.