Outlook for Oil and Gas in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 18/October 2012

The aim of this report is to elaborate the MEDPRO Energy Reference Scenario for oil and gas supply and demand up to 2030 for southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The report gives an assessment of • oil and gas reserves by country; • oil and gas production, domestic demand and export scenarios by country; and • the existing and planned infrastructure for oil and gas exports. Finally, the report presents some insights on the future role of the Mediterranean as an oil and gas transit region.

La Région Méditerranéenne en 2020 et son Rôle dans le Réseau Energétique Européen, Vol. II: La production et les eschanges de petrole, de gaz naturel et d'electricite: Situation actuelle et perspectives dans les PSEM et les pays du golfe. May 1994 = The Mediterranean region in 2020 and its Role in European Energy Network, Vol. II: Production and eschanges of oil, natural gas and electricity: Current situation and prospects in MENA countries and the countries of the Gulf. May 1994

None.

Russian gas industry - current condition and prospects; New regional 'in-security' system in Central Asia; Caspian oil and gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. OSW Study 1/2001

Russian gas industry: The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most crucial factors influencing the Russian state·s functioning, internal situation and international position. Not only is gas the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European gas exporter strengthens also Russia's importance in the international arena. New regional in-security: Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states declared their independence, but their relationship with Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping Central Asia within the orbit of Moscow·s influence is the fact that Russia exercises control over the most important transport routes out of the region of raw materials for the power industry, on which the economic development of Asia depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central Asia·s economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power industry dependence) to shape the situation in the region. Caspian oil and gas: Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most probably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale. Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil, and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the existence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by extension the political influences of Russia in the region.

The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. OSW Study 12/2003

The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future.

After a nuclear deal: What next for Iranian oil and gas? EPC Policy Brief, 23 June 2015

On 2 April in Lausanne, after months of intense negotiations, Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) agreed on a framework deal for the resolution of the nuclear dispute. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, issued a joint statement announcing that "solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" have been found. While differences remain on several issues, including the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and sanctions relief, the statement has nevertheless raised hopes that a final deal may be reached this summer. If accomplished, an agreement would bring an end to more than a decade of tensions between Iran and the international community. This would result in the lifting of several sanctions, which were adopted against Iran by the United Nations, the EU, and the US. Unsurprisingly therefore, Iran's economy and in particular its energy sector are now the subject of worldwide attention.

The Price of Oil and Soviet/Russian Aggressiveness. CEPS Commentary, 16 January 2015

A decade-long period of a steadily rising oil prices (and that of other raw materials) has given Russia a feeling of strength, bordering on invulnerability, which has made the country more assertive, and ready to use any opportunity to deploy its military power. Based on his analysis of Russian behaviour over the past 50 years, Daniel Gros finds that the abrupt reversal of this trend since the summer of 2014 portends a much less aggressive Russian stance as long as the price of oil remains at present levels.

Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.