Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

Too many presidents "spoil the broth"?- What role for the European Commission in global climate change politics?

The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. Although the competence for action in climate change is shared between the national governments and the supranational level of the European Union, on behalf of the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international climate change negotiations. The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) brought a number of changes to the institutional framework of the European Union, most significantly to the European Council and the external role of the EU. These changes appear to have added to the complexity which surrounds issues of the external representation of the EU and not simplified them – are there too many ‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? This paper questions the extent to which these changes will impact on the Commission headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate change policy and hence direction to the approach which the EU takes in global climate change politics.