Micro-based evidence of EU competitiveness: The CompNet Database. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 253, March 2014

Drawing from confidential firm-level balance sheets in 11 European countries, the paper presents a novel sectoral database of comparable productivity indicators built by members of the Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet) using a newly developed research infrastructure. Beyond aggregate information available from industry statistics of Eurostat or EU KLEMS, the paper provides information on the distribution of firms across several dimensions related to competitiveness, e.g. productivity and size. The database comprises so far 11 countries, with information for 58 sectors over the period 1995-2011. The paper documents the development of the new research infrastructure, the construction of the database, and shows some preliminary results. Among them, it shows that there is large heterogeneity in terms of firm productivity or size within narrowly defined industries in all countries. Productivity, and above all, size distribution are very skewed across countries, with a thick left-tail of low productive firms. Moreover, firms at both ends of the distribution show very different dynamics in terms of productivity and unit labour costs. Within-sector heterogeneity and productivity dispersion are positively correlated to aggregate productivity given the possibility of reallocating resources from less to more productive firms. To this extent, we show how allocative efficiency varies across countries, and more interestingly, over different periods of time. Finally, we apply the new database to illustrate the importance of productivity dispersion to explain aggregate trade results.

Democracy Promotion and the EU, US Formulas: Photo Opportunities or Potential. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 5, May 2014

Why do we think more of the United States (US) than the European Union (EU) in discussing Afghani or Iraqi democratization, and EU more than US when it is East European? Should not democratization be the same? A comparative study asks what democracy has historically meant in the two regions, how democratization has been spelled out, why instruments utilized differ, and democracy within global leadership contexts. Neither treats democracy as a vital interest, but differences abound: (a) While the US shifted from relative bottom-up to top-down democracy, the EU added bottom-up to its top-down approach; (b) the US interprets democracy as the ends of other policy interests, the EU treats it as the means to other goals; and (c) flexible US instruments contrast with rigid EU counterparts. Among the implications: (a) the 4-stage US approach reaches globally wider than EU’s multi-dimensional counterpart, but EU’s regional approach sinks deeper than the US’s; (b) human rights find better EU than US anchors; (c) whereas the US approach makes intergovernmental actions the sine qua non of democratization, EU’s intergovernmental, transnational, and supranational admixture promotes quid pro quo dynamics and incremental growth; and (d) competitive democratization patterns creates lock-ins for both recipient and supplier countries.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8