Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 28/2013

Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail at that time. While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with unknown destination and full of surprises.

Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process. CEPS Working Document No. 423 / June 2016

Although the Minsk process brought about a de-escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not all of its 13 points have been implemented, including a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry. In the absence of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US, to respond to Russia’s aggression. At the end of June 2016, when EU Heads of State and Government meet to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement the commitments it took upon itself in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in the Ukraine crisis, the leaders of the EU ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push for the renegotiation of the Minsk II agreement and widen the ‘Normandy format’ to include the US and bolster reforms in Ukraine.