Comparative regional perspectives: the Bologna process and higher education attainment. Jean Monnet/Robert Schumann Paper Series Vol 13 No. 11, August 2013

Since 1999, countries have voluntarily chosen to reform their higher education systems to join the European Higher Education Area. This paper compares Bologna Process implementation across four regions within the European Union. While there are 47 countries participating in the Bologna Process, this paper uses statistical analysis to consider 25 of the 28 EU Member States. The time period of analysis is 2000-2011, prior to Croatia’s accession to the EU on 1 July 2013. Across Europe there are inter-regional differences in how the Bologna Process has been implemented and in the political economy contexts that influence higher education reform for policy convergence. There are three explanatory variables in the political economy context: 1. competitive economic pressures and globalization 2. domestic politics at the national level 3. leadership from the supranational European Union that socially constructs regional norms Tertiary education attainment is the dependent variable of interest in this research. The objective of 40%, for 30-34 year olds, is Europe 2020 benchmark target. There are additional higher education reform criteria encompassed in the Bologna Process. These criteria concern Credit and Degree Structure, Quality Assurance, and Recognition of academic degrees among countries in the EHEA. This tertiary education attainment variable, which is of interest in this paper, does not capture the entire implementation process. Nevertheless, it is a measure of one important indicator of success in providing higher education access to populations within the context of democratic governance. This research finds that statistically GDP Per Capita is the most significant variable in relationship to tertiary education attainment across four regional areas in the European Union.

EU enlargement to the Balkans: will the leopard change its spots? EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with the Balkans. Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of European integration, more generally. With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November?

National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.4, 2002

In spite of domestic and international political changes, French and German foreign policies have displayed high degrees of continuity between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s. Over the same time period, the directions of the two states’ foreign policies have also continued to differ from each other. Why do states similar in many respects often part ways in what they want and do? This article argues that the French and German national role conceptions (NRCs) account for both of these continuities. NRCs are domestically shared understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. As internal reference systems, they affect national interests and foreign policies. This article reestablishes the NRC concept, empirically codes it for France and Germany for the time period under consideration, and demonstrates comparatively how different NRCs lead to varying interests and policies across the major policy areas in security, defense, and armament.