Eurozone as home country of banks. CEPS Commentary, 2 July 2012

The euro area summit has managed to surprise the markets once again. By moving banking supervision of the eurozone to the European Central Bank, a huge step towards a more federal banking model has been taken, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. But will this move be enough to re-establish confidence, bolster the euro interbank market and further financial integration?

The Cyprus Presidency: Pragmatism amid European anxiety. CEPS Commentary, 24 January 2013

Despite several daunting obstacles, the low expectations and the high level of apprehension that accompanied the start of the Cyprus Presidency, Thomas Linders and Steven Blockmans find in a new CEPS Commentary that the small, remote and politically divided island nevertheless succeeded in scoring a number of positive results, thanks in part to the country’s pragmatic approach to the job and the perpetual motion of the EU legislature. As a corrective instrument to big state politics in the EU, however, the role of the Presidency remains limited. This underscores the changed nature of the rotating Presidency of the the Council of the EU since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Despite several daunting obstacles, the low expectations and the high level of apprehension that accompanied the start of the Cyprus Presidency, this CEPS Commentary by Thomas Linders and Steven Blockmans expresses surprise that the small, remote and politically divided island succeeded in scoring a number of positive results at all, thanks in part to the country’s pragmatic approach to the job

Authorisations under EU internal market rules. Research Paper in Law, 05/2013

From the Introduction. That the requirement of a prior authorisation, as a precondition for the exercise of any economic activity, may restrict the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services is a truism. If an authorisation is required in the Member State where establishment is to take place or the service is to be offered (host Member State), then operators who lack such authorisation are in no right to proceed to the projected activity. Therefore, as soon as it is being accepted that the EU internal market rules are not only about discriminatory measures, but also cover mere restrictions, it comes as no surprise that national authorisation systems come to be scrutinized under the Internal Market rules.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’. EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013

The first in a series for a CEPS-EPIN project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative” this paper is pegged on an ambitious ongoing exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union. The intention is that this should provide a basis for informed debate before the referendum on the UK remaining in the EU or not, which is scheduled for 2017. This paper summarises the first six reviews, each of which runs to around 80 pages, covering foreign policy, development policy, taxation, the single market, food safety, and public health. The present authors then add their own assessments of these materials. While understandably giving due place to British interests, they are of general European relevance. The substantive conclusions of this first set of reviews are that the competences of the EU are judged by respondents to be ‘about right’ on the whole, which came as a surprise to eurosceptic MPs and the tabloid media. Our own view is that the reviews are objective and impressively researched, and these populist complaints are illustrating the huge gap between the views of informed stakeholders and general public opinion, and therefore also the hazard of subjecting the ‘in or out’ choice for decision by referendum. If the referendum is to endorse the UK’s continuing membership there will have to emerge some fresh popular narratives about the EU. The paper therefore concludes with some thoughts along these lines, both for the UK and the EU as a whole.

What Cameron should have known: Q &A. CEPS Commentary, 4 November 2014

The surprise revelation that the UK would be paying a surcharge to the EU budget of €2.1 billion sent Prime Minister Cameron into a rampage. How could this misunderstanding have arisen, as the resources mechanism of the EU budget uses a rather rigid method of calculation agreed by all member states? In this Commentary, CEPS budget specialist Jorge Núñez Ferrer has adopted a Q&A format to provide a straightforward technical explanation of how the surcharge came about in an attempt to dispel the Machiavellian phantasies it has inspired in journalists and eurosceptics alike.

What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 125, 22.01.2014

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to disputes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led movement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

The Kyrgyzstani Presidential Elections: Atambaev’s Challenges. EUCAM Commentary No. 21, November 2011

After much anticipation and anxiety about the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, there is a feeling of relief that Almazbek Atambaev won the contest with an overwhelming majority, making a second round of elections unnecessary. The presidential race passed off without violence and unrest, which many in Kyrgyzstan consider an achievement in itself. The scale of Atambaev’s majority took many commentators by surprise as some had predicted a low turnout and a strong oppositional challenge. But according to the Central Electoral Commission, the turnout was 61.28 percent and Atambaev gained 63 percent of the votes. The elections were observed by 792 international observers from 56 countries. Although international observers have criticized electoral irregularities, pointing to incomplete voter registrations and ballot stuffing, overall the elections were assessed as encouraging.

Toward international peace and security: Addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a globalized world. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.

The Rocky Road to an EU-Armenia Agreement: From U-turn to detour. CEPS Commentary, 3 February 2015

The EU was taken by surprise when the President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, stood by his Russian counterpart and announced Armenia’s plans to join the Russian-led Customs Union in September 2013. After all, before this announcement Armenia and the EU had successfully concluded negotiations on their Association Agreement. Armenia is still suffering the consequences of the Kremlin’s coercion to reject this Association Agreement. Indeed, as Armenians around the world commemorate the centenary of the Armenian Genocide by Ottoman Turkey, the Republic of Armenia is facing mounting challenges. The country remains subject to an economic blockade by Turkey and is in conflict with Azerbaijan. Ever since President’s Sargsyan’s astonishing volte-face, the EU and Armenia are still in the process of trying to rework the failed agreement. The author of this commentary argues that because the future of any new agreement is uncertain, negotiations should be accompanied by a pragmatic EU-Armenia roadmap. This roadmap, alongside the start of the visa liberalisation process and Armenia’s signing up to the European Common Aviation Agreement and Horizon 2020, could become a deliverable at the Riga Summit on 26-27 April 2015.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach? The EU’s Involvement with Georgia’s Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2015.

The August war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia caught the world by surprise but nevertheless brought the European Union (EU) to the forefront of the international efforts to end the hostilities, and the EU became the leading international actor involved with the conflict resolution process. However, in the years following the armed conflict, the conflict resolution process lost pace, and the impact of the EU beyond the immediate aftermath of the August 2008 war has been put into question. By undertaking a qualitative case study, this paper aims to explore to what extent the EU has impacted on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015. It will argue that the EU’s policies have only to a limited extent impacted on this conflict resolution process, which can be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies. The EU’s efforts have significantly contributed to the objective of conflict prevention, but the profile of the EU in the field of international conflict management weakened its position in the area of conflict transformation, where the lack of progress in turn limited the EU’s impact in the areas of international conflict management and conflict settlement. The main conclusion put forward is that in order to have a true impact, the EU needs to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to conflict resolution.

The Electoral Verdict and After: The Road Ahead for India. Asia Policy Brief 2014/04, June 2014

The convincing victory of the BJP in the 2014 Indian general elections came as a surprise to many. Most opinion polls, which had predicted a win for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that it leads, had not anticipated the scale of the party’s victory. The BJP alone won 282 seats and the NDA 336 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. Two things stand out in the verdict. This is the first time in 30 years that a party won a majority on its own; this is also the worst-ever showing by India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress, which won a mere 44 seats, 70 less than its previous all-time low in 1999.

Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations Command. Security Policy Brief No. 70, April 2016

The setting up of a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key element of the ongoing Belgian defence reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put the present demand for special operations forces in its historical context and engage in the discussion on how to structure and employ this special instrument of policy. Building on the legacy of the paracommando regiment, the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a critical capability within an adaptive force structure. This new entity must be able to deliver results in a variety of unconventional missions that require high readiness, intellectual flexibility and maximum discretion or surprise. At the same time, special operations forces do not constitute a substitute for having a comprehensive security policy. They function best when used as force multipliers alongside other instruments of power towards joint effect. As the proverbial tip of the spear, they must lead the way for Belgian defence regeneration in general.

The need to re-engage Europe's youth. EPC Commentary, 18 July 2016

In the immediate aftermath of the UK EU referendum, the breakdown of results sparked talks of a generational conflict, with young people – who voted overwhelmingly to remain - being blamed for having brought Brexit on themselves with their dismally low 36% turnout. New data compiled by the London School of Economics reduces the grounds for these accusations, suggesting a 64% turnout for 18-24 year olds. While this is certainly positive, the problem of youth disengagement lingers as the 64% turnout of those aged 18-24 has to be weighed against a 90% turnout of those aged 65+. This should not come as a surprise as Britain generally has the lowest youth turnout in Europe and the last referendum confirmed a trend that is not at all new, neither in Britain nor in other European countries.