Member State BITS after the Treaty of Lisbon: solid foundation or first victims of EU investment policy? Research Paper in Law, 02/2012

[Introduction.] This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on the basis of the proposed Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries presented by the Commission on 7 July 20101 and the European Parliament’s Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.2 The proposed Regulation and the Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the development of an EU international investment policy”.3 The first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief introduction of the notion of investment law and the scope of the EU’s new investment competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach.

The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly? Research Papers in Law, 4/2005

From the Introduction. “We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future of Europe”.1 In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a “constitutional moment”.2

The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free Provision of Services : 2000 - 2005. Research Papers in Law, 2/2006

Introduction. The present overview covers the period starting from 2000 until the end of 2005.1 This is the follow-up to our overview covering the 1995-1999 period.2 The first striking feature of the present contribution is that it has to deal with almost 3,5 times as many cases as the previous one. Hence, the ECJ has gone from deciding 40 cases in the five year period between 1995- 1999 to deciding over 140 cases based on Art 49 between 2000-2005. This confirms, beyond any doubt, the tendency already observed in our previous overview, that a “third generation” case law on services is being developed at a very rapid pace by the ECJ. This third generation case law is based on the idea that Article 49 EC is not limited to striking down discriminatory measures but extends to the elimination of all hindrances to the free provision of services. This idea was first expressed in the Tourist Guide cases, the Greek and Dutch TV cases and most importantly in the Säger case.3 It has been confirmed ever since. As was to be expected, this broad brush approach of the Court’s has led to an ever-increasing amount of litigation reaching Luxemburg. It is clear that, if indicators were used to weight the importance of the Court’s case law during the relevant period, services would score much higher than goods, both from a quantitative and from a qualitative perspective.4 Hence, contrary to the previous overview, this one cannot deal in detail with any of the judgments delivered during the reference period. The aim of the present contribution is restricted to presenting the basic trends of the Court’s case law in the field of services Therefore, the analysis follows a fundamentally horizontal approach, fleetingly considering the facts of individual cases, with a view to identifying the conceptual premises of the Court’s approach to the free movement of services. Nonetheless, the substantial solutions adopted by the Court in some key topics, such as concession contracts, healthcare services, posted workers and gambling, are also presented as case studies. In this regard, the analysis is organized in four sections. First we explore the (ever expanding) scope of the freedom to provide services (Section 2), then we go on to identify the nature of the violations and of justifications thereto (Section 3), before carrying out some case studies to concretely illustrate the above (Section 4). Then, for the sake of completeness, we try to deduce the general principles running through the totality of the relevant case law (Section 5). Inevitably, some concluding remarks follow (Section 6).5

Exploitative Abuses: Which Competition Policy, Which Public Policy? Research Papers in Law, 2/2007

As the final session of the day, my aim in this paper is to briefly outline the nature of exploitative abuses before turning to the question of the relationship between competition law and intellectual property law in the context of what Teubner calls the regulatory trilemma and from that draw a two-fold conclusion. First, the demands on law from the social phenomenon of markets are more acute when those demands raise issues across the different law domains of IP and competition. Second, where IP law and competition meet, the aim should be for both domains to internalise the values of the other. This however can only happen to the extent but only to the extent that there can be what Collins1 calls productive disintegration. Finally, in the specific context of exploitative abuses the overlap between IP law and competition law arises primarily in relation to claims of excessive pricing in licensing arrangements. Such claims could form the basis of a private action2 or can be made in the context of compulsory dealing decisions such as Microsoft.3 The involvement of competition agencies in pricing decisions goes to the heart of concerns about the nature of competition law and the role of competition agencies and highlights the need for the law to indirectly control rather than inappropriately attempt to directly control markets.

Liberalising trade in services: creating new migration opportunities? Research Paper in Law, 1/2010

Introduction. It is quite uncommon to associate migration with the rules on services trade. Indeed, all economic definitions of services insist on their immaterial nature and on the increased possibility of trading them ‘virtually’ over networks or else, without any physical movement of the parties involved. Somehow this ‘immaterial’ nature of services reflects on their providers/recipients which seem to be ‘invisible’. Even though most services still require the physical contact of the provider with the recipient1 and, when provided over national borders, do entail migration, service providers and/or recipients are rarely thought of as ‘immigrants’. This may be due to the fact that they enter the foreign territory with a specific aim and, once this aim accomplished, move back to their state of origin; technically they only qualify as short term non-cyclical migrants and are of little interest to policy-makers. A second reason may be that both service providers and recipients are economically desirable: the former are typically highly skilled and trained professionals and the latter are well-off ‘visitors’, increasing consumption in the host state. The legal definition of services in Article 57 TFEU (ex Art. 50 EC) further nourishes this idea about service providers/recipients not being migrants: the relevant Treaty rules only apply when the provisions on free movement of workers and freedom of establishment – themselves clearly linked to migration – do not apply. This distinction has been fleshed up by the ECJ which has consistently held that the distinction between the rules on establishment, on the one hand, and the rules on services, on the other, lies on duration.2 Indeed, all EC manuals state four types of service provision falling under the EC Treaty: a) where the service provider moves to the recipient’s state, for a short period of time (longer stay would amount to establishment), b) where the service recipients themselves move to the state where the service is offered (eg for medical care, education, tourism etc), c) where both service providers and recipients move together in another member state (eg a tourist guide accompanying a group travelling abroad) and d) where the service itself is provided across the borders (typically through the use of ICTs). None of these situations would typically qualify as migration. The above ‘dissociation’ between services and migration has been gradually weakened in the recent years. Indeed, migration is increasingly connected to the transnational provision of services. This is the result of three kinds of factors: developments in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law; legislative initiatives in the EU; and the GATS. Each one of these is considered in some detail below. The aim of the analysis which follows is to show the extent to which (legislative and judicial) policies aimed at the free provision of services actively affect migration conditions within the EU. The EC rules on the provision of services primarily affect the movement of EU nationals. As it will be shown below, however, third country nationals (TCNs) may also claim the benefits of the rules on services, either as recipients thereof or as employees of some EC undertaking which is providing services in another member state (posted workers).

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.

Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

General Principles of EU Law: The Ghost in the Platonic Heaven in Need of Conceptual Clarification. Pittsburgh Papers on the European Union Vol. 2, 2013

General principles are en vogue in EU law – and in need of conceptual clarification. A closer look at several concepts of principle in legal philosophy and legal theory sheds light upon the concept of general principles in EU law. A distinction between an aprioristic model of principle and a model of principle informed by legal positivism may contribute to clarifying the genesis of a (general) principle in EU law, as well as its nature and functions. This paper demonstrates that an evolution has taken place from a reliance on seemingly natural law inspired reflections of general principles via the desperate search to ground general principles in various kinds of sources based on a more or less sound methodology towards an increasing reliance on strictly positivistic approaches. Against this backdrop, general principles are likely to lose significance where there are other norms while retaining an important yet uncontrollable role where the traditional canon of sources is silent.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.