Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

Riding or Reaping the Whirlwind? An Account of the EU’s Engagement with Insecurity in Northern Nigeria. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 9, November 2014

The relations of the European Union (EU) with Africa are increasingly spreading beyond the domain of humanitarian and development cooperation. The continent’s growing potential is producing vast webs of interlinkages in the realms of energy and commerce, among others. At the same time, such interdependencies bring with them increased vulnerabilities to insecurity on the continent. Nigeria exemplifies such a dilemma. The country has just taken the top spot as Africa’s largest economy. Of late, however, violent Islamic extremism ravages the north of the country, threatening the stability of one of Europe’s foremost energy suppliers and a growing trade partner. Thus, this paper sets out to uncover the EU’s response to such a crisis, as well as examining the factors lying behind this response. While the study argues that the issue is potentially ‘Europeaniz-able’ from a member state perspective, deep engagement is seen to be held back by the absence of an effective entry point for securitization with this important ally, as well as the intractability of the EU’s purported multi-functional approach to the idiosyncrasies of the conflict in question, in which not only transnational terrorist groups, but also the central government are centrally implicated in deepening insecurity.

The Limited Influence of the European Union in Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Domestic Explanation. EU Diplomacy Paper 9/2015

This paper seeks to explain why the European Union (EU) has had limited influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Combining approaches from external governance, norm diffusion and structural foreign policy, it offers an explanation based on domestic factors in the two countries: the political regime, state capacity, political structures, domestic incentives and the perceived legitimacy of EU rules. Although willingness to reform appears to exist in Armenia, such willingness remains constrained by the country’s vulnerable geopolitical location and high dependence on Russia. By contrast, none of the domestic preconditions for EU influence identified by the analytical framework were found in Azerbaijan. The author argues that the Eastern Partnership has not properly addressed the extent to which the clan structures feed into informal political practices and enforce the sustainability of an existing regime in both countries, and that, in addition, the EU has underestimated the multipolar environment which the two countries have to operate in, making it unlikely that the current policy can reach its objectives in Armenia and Azerbaijan.