Horizontal and Vertical Interdependence in the Multinational Subsidiary Networks. ACES Working Paper No. 7, July 2008

Existing theoretical studies have predicted that a multinational firm's location choices are interdependent across countries. Little has, however, been done to test the hypothesis at individual subsidiary level. This paper uses a detailed French multinational subsidiary dataset and estimates how a firm's decision to invest in a foreign country is not only conditional on the characteristics of that country but also the firm's existing subsidiary network Using a structural spatial econometric model, the paper finds evidence of both horizontal and vertical interdependence in multinationals' location decisions. The results indicate that while multinational firms have little incentive to duplicate their production in countries with low bilateral trade costs, they are motivated to build a vertical subsidiary network in these countries ~ especially when the countries have complementary comparative advantages.

Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.