The EU's Group-to-Group Dialogue with the Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN – How much have they achieved? A Comparative Analysis. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No, 18, December 2013

Four decades of the EU's group-to-group dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean grouping of countries and with ASEAN have produced different dynamics and outcomes, despite the EU’s common strategy to use economic soft power to achieve their goals for the partnerships. Diverging conditions in the two regions created inconsistency in the EU's application of the common approach. The EU's neighbourhood security concerns forced it to relax its political stand with their Southern Mediterranean partners. For ASEAN, geographical distance dilutes the EU’s security concerns it that region and has afforded the EU to be more ideological and assertive on democracy and human rights practices. These issues have provoked disagreements in EU-ASEAN dialogues, but both sides have also tried to remain pragmatic in order to achieve some progress in the partnership. In contrast, the protracted the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to hamper the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, resulting in little progress. Social upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean also brought their partnership to a standstill. The EU's cooperation with former authoritarian regimes like Libya and Syria have only caused damage to its credibility in the Southern Mediterranean, and future Euro-Mediterranean dialogues are likely to be affected by it.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

"Europe-as-hegemony" and discourses in Turkey after 1999: Dialogue with the Europeanisation literature

It is not a prophecy to say that one of the most common concepts that those working on "Europe" would encounter at various points in different capacities would be "Europeanisation". This buzzword has also been crucial in understanding and explaining for Turkey's European orientation path, which acquired a new dimension and has been carried to a more substantive and institutional level with the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join the EU. Especially after this date, the concept of "Europeanisation" and the literature attached to it have almost automatically been employed to assess the relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration. For this aim, firstly, I present a tri-fold picture of the European studies. According to this categorisation, the studies dealing with the notion of „Europe‟ could be categorised into three groups: the studies which takes "Europe" as a fixed concept ("Europe-as-fixity"), those which subscribe to a notion of "Europe" solely as a construct ("Europe-as-construct") and the studies which take "Europe" as a contestation ("Europe-as-contestation"). After critically locating the Europeanisation literature within this categorisation, I argue that there is both a historical and epistemological need for the Europeanisation literature to address to the conflictual nature of the notion by focusing on how the discourses on "Europe" hegemonised the Turkish political terrain after 1999 and I introduce the notion of "Europe-as-hegemony". The overall argument is that the hegemony of "Europe" does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but rather from the power of discourses on "Europe" and their ability to hegemonise the political realm. In this respect, this paper offers a novel approach to the Europeanisation literature with a particular focus on the Turkish context where the political is not only given and constructed but is also reflexive and open to contestation and negotiation.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”