Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 234, October 2012

This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.

Swiss Banking Secrecy; The Erosion of an Institution. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2008

Switzerland has for a long time been an important centre of banking services in Europe and beyond. Consequently, the banking sector has become important to Switzerland’s prosperity. This paper focuses on a central reason behind the success of the Swiss banking sector: the institution of banking secrecy, deeply enshrined in the Swiss history and tradition. The rapid development of international markets that eventually gave rise to a “group structuration process” has, however, progressively eroded Swiss banking secrecy. It has had to bend before the duty of transparency within the groups in order not to promote financial criminality through accelerated asset inflows. Switzerland has also had to develop a comprehensive legislative frame to tackle financial criminality, and to enter into international agreements providing for mutual assistance. This process has undoubtedly and irremediably weakened the Swiss banking secrecy. Most importantly, nevertheless, the questionable ethical and socio-economic grounds of this controversial institution could and should also start to erode it from within.

Regulation of European Banks and Business Models: Towards a new paradigm? CEPS Paperbacks. June 2012

Amidst talks of establishing an EU-wide banking union, the recent changes in the regulatory framework and the rethinking of the future of European banking structure, the future of EU bank regulation is inextricably linked to banks’ business models. Using a sample of over 70 banks, which overlaps with those subjected to the EBA’s 2011 stress tests, this report emphasizes the key regulatory gaps that emerge from a comprehensive analysis of the soundness and performance of bank business models and provides policy-makers with guidance to reinforce the evolving regulatory framework in European banking.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Banks at the Service of the Economy? European Policy Brief No. 17, November 2013

This Policy Brief discusses a few simple measures to improve both the commercial and investment banking landscapes, with or without formal separation. Covering deposits with quality collateral would make them safer and would help create an easier guarantee and resolution mechanism at the larger eurozone level. Strong central counterparties and transparency requirements would improve market mechanisms and market discipline in capital markets and investment banking. Specific governance measures would also help improve the financial sector. Finally, a better control of bank solvency, together with improved capital market transparency and accessibility, should encourage the progressive deleveraging of commercial banks, and enhance the long term funding of the economy by capital markets.

Banks and the political economy of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #18, 2013-2014

This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to euroarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive features of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contributes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later.

Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts. CES Papers - Open Forum #8, 2012

How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.

The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer lending. ECRI Research Report No 17, May 2016

This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs of customers.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Supporting Access to Finance by SMEs: Mapping the initiatives in five EU countries. ECMI Research Report No. 9, April 2014

This paper maps the initiatives to support access to finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that were available at national level in 2012 in the five biggest European economies (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain). This mapping distinguishes initiatives promoted and financed primarily through public resources from those developed independently by the market. A second breakdown is proposed for those sources of finance with different targets, i.e. whether the target is debt financing (typically bank loans at favourable conditions, public guarantees on loans, etc.) or equity financing (typically venture capital funds, tax incentives on equity investments, etc.). A broad set of initiatives has been implemented to close the funding gap of SMEs in these five countries. The total amount of public spending for SMEs, however, has remained well below 1% of GDP. Public subsidisation of bank loans has been by far the most diffused type of intervention. Despite the fact that this strategy might prove to be effective in the short term, it fails to address long-term sustainability issues via a more diversified set of financing tools.

Where is the credit crunch in Greece? CEPS Commentary, 6 October 2015

Greek policy-makers like to make the point that their economy cannot recover because of a lack of credit and that this affects exports, in particular. Austerity is an easy explanation for the weakness of domestic demand, argues Daniel Gros in this CEPS Commentary, but it is more difficult to see why Greek exports have stagnated in recent years. The author considers the argument that the Greek economy could not recover via export-led growth because of a credit crunch. The overall availability of credit was higher than GDP, and interest rates remained relatively low. There is some indication of a misallocation of bank credit, but the responsibility for any mistakes in this direction must lie squarely with the government and the Troika, given that the Greek banking system has been under government control since 2012.

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015

International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency, or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. • We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index. It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macroprudential data about their financial systems.The Index covers 68 high-income and emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011). • We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are generally more opaque than other high-income countries.This finding is especially relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union. • Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is considerable variation. Some countries have become significantlymore transparent, while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during financial crises. • We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit insurance scheme.