4 resultados para Default probability
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.
Resumo:
In 1991, Bryant and Eckard estimated the annual probability that a cartel would be detected by the US Federal authorities, conditional on being detected, to be at most between 13 % and 17 %. 15 years later, we estimated the same probability over a European sample and we found an annual probability that falls between 12.9 % and 13.3 %. We also develop a detection model to clarify this probability. Our estimate is based on detection durations, calculated from data reported for all the cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1969 to the present date, and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and detection of cartels.
Resumo:
The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.
Resumo:
Both the EU and its member states are in a period of rethinking security strategy to adapt to contemporary challenges both in the European region and beyond, including Northeast Asia. In this Security Policy Brief, Mason Richey discusses what difficulties and risks a North Korean regime collapse would pose, the likelihood that it will occur sooner rather than later, and how Europe will be affected by such a scenario.