The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

German macro: how it's different and why that matters. EPC Discussion Paper, May 2016

Do the macroeconomics of the German political establishment really differ from standard western macroeconomics? That question was the starting point for the seminar on ‘German macro: How it’s Different and Why that Matters’, which was held at Heriot-Watt University in December 2015, with financial support from the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) and the Money, Macro & Finance Research Group (MMF). This ebook, edited by George Bratsiotis and David Cobham, is the result of that exercise; six of the papers were presented at the seminar in earlier versions, and the editors sought some additional papers to complete the range of perspectives offered. The authors all sought out to discover whether or not there is something unique about German macroeconomics, and in what ways it differs from standard western macroeconomics; is it true that the former neglects demand management (although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), rejects debt relief and emphasises structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? In what way does it relate to Germany’s own experiences in different periods? And how far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and indeed the health of the German economy?

IMF Go Home. CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2016. No pdf available-see document at original URL

The curtains have gone up on yet another act of the Greek debt drama. Eurozone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund have agreed with Greece to begin, per the IMF’s demands, providing some debt relief to the country, and to release €10.3 billion in bailout funds. Greece, for its part, has agreed to another round of austerity and structural reform.