De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

The Protocol of Frankfurt: a new treaty for the eurozone. EPC Discussion Paper, 12 January 2016

At a time when the EU finds itself in a perfect storm of crises which it seems unable to overcome, a bold move is needed to reinvigorate the EU’s system of government and stave off the risk of disintegration. In order to address the inherent weakness of the EU’s monetary and economic governance, this pamphlet proposes a new treaty for the eurozone: the Protocol of Frankfurt. Written by Andrew Duff, former Member of the European Parliament and Visiting Fellow at the EPC, it is the first ever attempt to draft a treaty aimed at setting up a fiscal union. “The Protocol of Frankfurt provides the constitutional framework for a proper economic government and will, hopefully, also serve to accelerate the debate on the Five Presidents’ Report”. Realising that the time is not ripe for a major constitutional overhaul, the pamphlet instead puts forward a shorter treaty revision that concentrates on re-engineering the Maastricht arrangements for the economic and monetary union, taking on the form of a Protocol to be added on to the existing Treaties. Article 48(2) of the Treaty on European Union allows the government of any member state, the European Parliament or the Commission to table amendments to the Treaties. Our hope is that somebody, informed by this draft Protocol, does just that.