Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study. OSW Point of View Number 42, May 2014

The Crimean operation has served as an occasion for Russia to demonstrate to the entire world the capabilities and the potential of information warfare. Its goal is to use difficult to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in other countries by making use of various kinds of secret and overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. Russian politicians and journalists have argued that information battles are necessary for “the Russian/Eurasian civilisation” to counteract “informational aggression from the Atlantic civilisation led by the USA”. This argument from the arsenal of applied geopolitics has been used for years. This text is an attempt to provide an interpretation of information warfare with the background of Russian geopolitical theory and practice.

Ukraine-A week of testing red lines ahead. CEPS Commentaries, 3 March 2014

Despite the rapidly escalating situation in Ukraine, Michael Emerson discerns in this CEPS Commentary a very slim margin of possibility that cooler heads may still prevail in the Crimean peninsula and allow a return to a mundane and peaceful normality.

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

Ukraine on the edge. EPC Commentary, 24 April 2014

During the past six months Ukraine has been through a revolution, its Crimean peninsula has been annexed by Russia and its territorial integrity continues to be challenged. With ongoing unrest in three Eastern regions, a peace deal recently agreed in Geneva hangs by a thread as pro-Russian separatists continue to occupy numerous public buildings and international actors remain divided over how long to wait for Russia to implement the accord before placing new sanctions. While the West accuses Russia of provoking and influencing the unrest, Russia points the finger at Ukraine’s interim leadership which it claims is illegal and “fascist”.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

The language issue in Ukraine: An attempt at a new perspective. OSW Study 40/2012

Ukraine has been an independent state for only 20 years and the consequence of the long-term incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian/Soviet state is an ethnically mixed society. In Ukraine, alongside Ukrainians, there are very many Russians and members of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union as well as a still large group of people who identify themselves as Soviets (in terms of their nationality). A significant part of Ukrainians use Russian in their everyday life (particularly professional) while knowing Ukrainian to only a small degree or not at all. Due to this Kyiv has to implement a language policy (which does not have to be pursued in e.g. Poland or Hungary) in search of solutions to ensure the stable functioning of a modern state for a multilingual society. The language issue is therefore an important challenge for the Ukrainian state and one of the more significant issues in Ukraine’s internal politics. In this text I eschew a detailed analysis of the question of Crimea as its social dynamics (also in the language area) is clearly distinct from the remaining part of Ukraine for four reasons: the short-term character of the region’s links with Ukraine, its relative geographic isolation (Crimea is almost an island), the formal autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the presence of the Crimean Tatar community which is demanding the recognition of its language rights.

EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones. CEPS Working Document No. 402/January 2015

Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and Sevastopol. While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the Strengths for the EU to cultivate, Weaknesses to minimise, Opportunities to seize and Threats to counteract.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond? EPC Policy Brief, 12 October 2015

On 3 September 2015, Russia's 7th Guards Airborne-Assault (Mountain) Division kicked off an exercise near the Black Sea city of Novorossiysk, some 150 km southeast of the annexed Crimean peninsula. The timing was chosen carefully. 'Swift Response', a large-scale drill run by NATO alongside the coastline of Romania and Bulgaria, along with other European locations, had concluded several days earlier. Codenamed 'Slavic Brotherhood', the war games at Novorossiysk involved Belarusian Special Forces and, strikingly, paratroopers from Serbia. Here was a country negotiating its accession to the EU and a recent signatory of a cooperation deal with NATO that was siding with the self-declared competitor of the West.