Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

Financial openness of China and India: Implications for capital account liberalisation. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/05, May 15 2014

We gauge the de-facto capital account openness of the Chinese and Indian economies by testing the law of one price on the basis of onshore and offshore price gaps for three key financial instruments. Generally, the three measures show both economies becoming more financially open over time. Over the past decade, the Indian economy on average appears to be more open financially than the Chinese economy, but China seems to be catching up with India in the wake of the global financial crisis. Both have more work to do to open their capital accounts.

The EU, China and Southeast Asia: Divergent Views of Dealing with Human Security. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 8, May 2014

Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 166/15.04.2015

From the Introduction. In 2012, China approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal concerning regional cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. According to Chinese analysts, the rationale behind this breakthrough decision was Beijing’s acknowledgment of the growing importance of the region’s states within the European Union as well as a partial elimination of the ideological differences which had hamstrung cooperation in previous years. It seems that the eurozone crisis may be perceived as the reason for the CEE states’ increased interest in developing their cooperation with China. These circumstances have opened a ‘window of opportunity’ which Beijing has decided to exploit to create a kind of bridgehead in the region which it could later use in its further economic expansion in Europe. Apart from opening the CEE region up for investments, the ‘16+1’ format was intended to facilitate the shaping of relations between China and the EU and to become a tool in building a positive image for China. Chinese experts agree that after three years of functioning, the ‘16+1’ regional cooperation format has helped Beijing achieve its goals only to a limited extent. The major obstacles have included: the immense diversification of the region, barriers related to EU law, insufficient expertise on the part of Chinese companies, the asymmetry of economic needs on both sides, and no willingness within the region itself to develop cooperation. Regardless of the limited effectiveness of activities carried out so far, China has continued its ‘16+1’ initiative. This continuation and the progressing institutionalisation of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ format have often seemed superficial. China has been using this multi-party formula to improve its long-term bilateral relations with selected states in the region and thereby to create a basis for Beijing’s political and economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe.