Banking Union in the Eurozone and the European Union. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.

Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt Corrective Action. CEPS Policy Brief No. 282, 18 September 2012

The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking Union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. However, on a number of issues the Commission’s chosen path raises questions that should be brought out in the open and fully recognized before final deliberation by the Council.

The new European framework for managing bank crises. CEPS Policy Brief No. 304, 21 November 2013

This Policy Brief describes and discusses the proposals for a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks and for a Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR). The authors find that the proposals are generally well designed and present a consistent approach, yet there is room for improvement, including the streamlining of procedures for the start of resolution, which now entail much overlap in the powers attributed to the various institutions involved (the Commission, the Single Resolution Board and the European Central Bank). The paper makes a number of key recommendations to facilitate discussions for stakeholders and regulators.

The steel industry in the European Union: Composition and drivers of energy prices and costs. CEPS Special Report No. 80, 17 December 2013

This report assesses the energy costs borne by the steel industry in the EU between 2010 and 2012, and compares the energy costs, including both the energy components and other regulatory costs, to production costs, turnover and margins of steel-makers. The estimates of energy costs are based on primary sources, i.e. is on information provided by steel-makers through a written questionnaire. This information was validated by the research team by checking annual energy bills, when available, and other public sources. In this respect, this exercise represents a unique fact-based investigation into the costs of energy for steel-makers in Europe, whereas most of the information currently available in the public domain is based on secondary or statistical information. In 2012, the median EU steel plant pays about €33/MWh for gas, up from €26/MWh in 2010. As for electricity, in 2012 the EU median plant pays €62/MWh, up from €59/MWh in 2010. The report also includes a comparison with the prices of energy carriers paid by producers based in the US.

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

The Composition and Drivers of Energy Prices and Costs in Energy-Intensive Industries: The Case of Ceramics, Glass and Chemicals. CEPS Special Report No. 85, 27 March 2014

In May 2013, the European Commission received a mandate from the European Council to “to present an analysis of the composition and drivers of energy prices and costs in Member States, with a particular focus on the impact on households, SMEs and energy intensive industries, and looking more widely at the EU's competitiveness vis-à-vis its global economic counterparts”. Following such mandate and in view of the preparation by the Commission of a Communication and a Staff Working Document, DG Enterprise and Industry commissioned CEPS to carry out a set of studies aimed at providing well-grounded evidence about the evolution and composition of energy prices and costs at plant level within individual industry sectors. A team of CEPS researchers conducted the research, led by Christian Egenhofer and Lorna Schrefler. Vasileios Rizos served as Project Coordinator. Other CEPS researchers contributing to the project included: Fabio Genoese, Andrea Renda, Andrei Marcu, Julian Wieczorkiewicz, Susanna Roth, Federico Infelise, Giacomo Luchetta, Lorenzo Colantoni, Wijnand Stoefs, Jacopo Timini and Felice Simonelli. In addition to an introductory report entitled “About the Study and Cross-Sectoral Analysis”, CEPS prepared five sectoral case studies: two on ceramics (wall and floor tiles and bricks and roof tiles), two on chemicals (ammonia and chlorine) and one on flat glass. Each of these six studies has been consolidated in this single volume for free downloading on the CEPS website. The specific objective was to complement information already available at macro level with a bottom-up perspective on the operating conditions that industry stakeholders need to deal with, in terms of energy prices and costs. The approach chosen was based on case studies for a selected set (sub-)sectors amongst energy-intensive industries. A standard questionnaire was circulated and respondents were sampled according to specified criteria. Data and information collected were finally presented in a structured format in order to guarantee comparability of results between the different (sub-)sectors analysed. The complete set of files can also be downloaded from the European Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7238&lang=en&title=Study-on-composition-and-drivers-of-energy-prices-and-costs-in-energy-intnsive-industries The results of the studies were presented at a CEPS Conference held on February 26th along with additional evidence from other similar studies. The presentations can be downloaded at: http://www.ceps.eu/event/level-and-drivers-eu-energy-prices-energy-inten...

The Impact of TTIP: The underlying economic model and comparisons. CEPS Special Report No. 93/13 October 2014. [TTIP Series No. 1]

What are the economic and other impacts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership? At the request of the European Parliament, CEPS has provided an appraisal of the TTIP Impact Assessment carried out by the European Commission, with special elaboration of the underlying economic model. The methodology applied by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) for this economic modelling is analysed in depth, together with the assumptions used to make TTIP amenable to an economic appraisal. The research paper also compares the IA on TTIP with selected previous empirical economic assessments of EU trade agreements and with a set of alternative studies on TTIP itself. In reading our findings, two central caveats should be kept in mind that affect any analysis of the CGE model included in the European Commission’s Impact Assessment. First, TTIP is a rather unusual bilateral trade agreement; and second, TTIP is so wide-ranging that an alternative approach, such as the so-called ‘partial’ (equilibrium) approach – already a second-best solution – would be totally inappropriate to the case under examination.

Economic Incentives for Indirect TTIP Spillovers. CEPS Special Report No. 94/October 2014 [TTIP Series No. 2]

A deep, comprehensive and ambitious TTIP should not undermine or otherwise negatively affect the WTO and its signatories. Among other things, this means that trade diversion ought to be minimised and positive spillovers stimulated. The present CEPS Special Report provides some elementary quantification, which helps to understand the economic incentives for third countries to seek regulatory alignment with TTIP results, where relevant, and for which TTIP should be ‘open’. It focuses on ‘indirect’ spillovers and employs a rather aggregate economic approach. We find that, of three groups of countries that are important for trade with the EU and the US, the ‘closest’ neighbours (NAFTA, EEA, Switzerland and Turkey) exhibit powerful incentives to align so as to benefit from positive spillovers. This is less clear for two other groups. Of the (seven) ‘biggest traders’ (in manufactured goods, for which spillovers matter most), China turns out to have the greatest interest in alignment in selected sectors, followed by Israel, Japan and South Korea. Whereas the latter three either have or are negotiating FTAs with the US and the EU, precisely China has none and remains outside TPP as well. In terms of sectors, the chemical sector followed by electronic equipment are by far the most important, with agro-products and fish as a good third (SPS issues). However, in chemicals and electrical equipment, the TTIP negotiations so far, and recent US/EU regulatory cooperation, do not indicate an ambitious approach, which could reduce regulatory barriers to market access drastically.

The role of politicians in inciting financial markets to attack the eurozone. EuropEos Commentary No. 4, 21 June 2010

While acknowledging that the sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted, this EuropEos Commentary finds that financial markets have blown the problem completely out of proportion, leading to a full-scale confidence crisis. The authors present evidence suggesting that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical junctures may have added oil to incipient fire. By creating the impression that domestic political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt crisis, they raised broader doubts about their ability to address fundamental economic divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in the medium term.