Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

EU-Turkey relations in the scope of the ongoing refugee crisis were at the heart of the European Council meeting of 7 March 2016. Among the set of initiatives proposed, the following two have attracted the most attention: First, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. This has come to be known as the ‘one for one’ resettlement approach. Second, all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey without offering any guarantee of protection.