How much does EU citizenship cost? The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair: A breakthrough for sincere cooperation in citizenship of the union? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 64, April/2014

How much does European citizenship cost in the EU? This was the question that has raised so much controversy over the Maltese citizenship-for-sale programme. The outright selling of Maltese nationality to rich foreigners led to unprecedented responses by the European Parliament and European Commission. This paper examines the affair and its relevance for current and future configurations of citizenship of the EU. It studies the extent to which member states are still free to lay down the grounds for the acquisition and loss of nationality without any EU supervision and accountability. It provides a comparative overview of member state schemes and the exact price for buying citizenship and a residency permit in the EU. It is argued that the EU’s intervention on the Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair constitutes a legal precedent for assessing the lawfulness of passport-for-sale or golden migration programmes in other EU member states. The affair has also revealed the increasing relevance of a set of European and international legal principles limiting member states’ discretion over citizenship matters and providing a supranational constellation of accountability venues scrutinising the impact of their decisions over citizenship of the Union. The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair has placed at the forefront the EU general principle of sincere cooperation in nationality matters. Member states’ actions in the citizenship domain cannot negatively affect in substance the concept and freedoms of European citizenship. That notwithstanding, the European institutions’ insistence on the need for Maltese nationality law to require a ‘genuine link’ in the form of an effective residence criteria for any rich applicants to benefit from the fast-track naturalisation poses a fundamental dilemma from the angle of Union citizenship: what is this genuine link really about? And what is precisely ‘habitual’, ‘effective’ or ‘functional’ residence? It is argued that by supporting the ‘real connections’ as the most relevant standard, the European institutions may be paradoxically fuelling nationalistic misuses by member states of the ‘genuine link’ as a way to justify restrictive integration policies on the acquisition of nationality.

The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

Lessons for the EU from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/01 • February 2013

Summary. From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Besides providing further evidence of growing Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the only source of foreign policy decisions in China, faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from larger social developments. Even if foreign policy decisions in China are still made without direct input from civil society, the influence of social forces on Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.

Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.8 (Series 53), 1993

Gennany has recently witnessed a vast increase in anti-foreign violence. Assembling data from a wide variety of recent research, the paper addresses two basic questions: to what extent is the outburst of xenophobic attacks a German peculiarity? and what are the explanations for the mcreasing violence? An analysis of criminal statistics of various European countries and of comparative opinion polls in the European Community shows that Germany has indeed witnessed a growth of anti-foreign sentiment, and a level of violence that is conspicuous from a com­ parative perspective. Four possible determinants of this peculiarity of recent German history are discussed: (1) the growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity due to the vast increase in immigration from non-European countries; (2) the increasing costs of foreigners' claims on the German welfare state; (3) the economic context of immigration; and (4) the transformation of national identity in the context of German unification. It is shown that neither the rate of immigration nor the position of foreigners in the German welfare state yields satisfactory explanations for the recent upsurge in violence, which only occurred after unification. The key for an explanation lies in a particu­lar macro-constellation that is characterized by the concurrence of a massive wave of immigration with an economic crisis, and with the ethnicization of German national identity in the context of unification. Anti-foreign sentiments do not automatically follow increases in immigration, but grow in a specific political climate to which the political elites actively contribute.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

Automatic Fiscal Stabiliser: Make it happen! EPC Discussion Paper, 2 May 2016

The eurozone crisis triggered a whole new series of innovations in EU economic governance in order to make the Union more resilient for the next economic downswing. But one of the more persistent issues are the socio-economic divergences between member states, identified by the Five Presidents’ Report as a major problem in the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Debates took place in recent years about automatic stabilisers, and more specifically about the possibility of introducing an unemployment insurance within the EMU. While the need for some form of fiscal risk-sharing has become a dominant view in expert circles, there has been much less progress among the main political parties and stakeholders. In this study, Regula Hess and László Andor analyse the political feasibility of the adoption of an automatic fiscal stabiliser (AFS) for the eurozone by evaluating actors’ positions towards three distinctive proposals: 1) cyclical shock insurance, 2) reinsurance, 3) a European basic unemployment insurance; they included an empirical case study of France and Germany as the most relevant players within the intergovernmental bargaining constellation. Although the authors realise the current political context makes the adoption of an AFS improbable, Hess and Andor encourage stakeholders to further pursue the discussion, as windows of opportunities can open at any time, and even give some suggestions on what the parameters of the most feasible proposal might be.