The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means. Security Policy Brief No. 38

Since May 2011, the EU has launched one of its most far reaching and sophisticated sanctions operations in support of the protests against the current regime in Syria. The present brief examines the measures wielded by the EU, its expected impact and its implications for the EU’s relations with its global partners. While seriously undermined by the lack of support of Russia, the sanctions are having a noticeable economic impact. Yet, the choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the bloodshed. The sanctions have also served to (re)define partnerships with other powers, both in the Middle-East and globally.

A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach? The EU’s Involvement with Georgia’s Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2015.

The August war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia caught the world by surprise but nevertheless brought the European Union (EU) to the forefront of the international efforts to end the hostilities, and the EU became the leading international actor involved with the conflict resolution process. However, in the years following the armed conflict, the conflict resolution process lost pace, and the impact of the EU beyond the immediate aftermath of the August 2008 war has been put into question. By undertaking a qualitative case study, this paper aims to explore to what extent the EU has impacted on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015. It will argue that the EU’s policies have only to a limited extent impacted on this conflict resolution process, which can be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies. The EU’s efforts have significantly contributed to the objective of conflict prevention, but the profile of the EU in the field of international conflict management weakened its position in the area of conflict transformation, where the lack of progress in turn limited the EU’s impact in the areas of international conflict management and conflict settlement. The main conclusion put forward is that in order to have a true impact, the EU needs to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to conflict resolution.

Why EU promotion is at odds with successful crisis management: public relations, news coverage, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 10, September 2012

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can be tools used to increase the international profile of the European Union. Nevertheless, CSDP missions garner little news coverage. This article argues that the very nature of the missions themselves makes them poor vehicles for EU promotion for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. By definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making news coverage politically sensitive. The very act of reporting could undermine the mission. Institutionally, all CSDP missions are intergovernmental, making press statements slow, overly bureaucratic, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, the missions are often located in remote, undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international journalists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. Using the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as a case study, the author concludes that although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the political function of raising the profile of the EU.

Policy Lessons for Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. CEPS Policy Brief No. 308, 13 December 2013

This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?

Ukraine: Can meaningful reform come out of conflict? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/08, August 2014

Apart from threats to its national security and territorial integrity, Ukraine faces serious economic challenges. These result from the slow pace of economic and institutional reform in the previous two decades, the populist policies of the Yanukovych era and the consequences of the conflict with Russia. The new Ukrainian authorities have made pro-reform declarations, but these do not seem to be supported sufficiently by concrete policy measures, especially in the critical areas of fiscal, balance-of-payment and structural adjustment. Also, the international financial aid package granted to Ukraine has not been accompanied by sufficiently strong policy conditionality. Ukraine urgently needs a complex programme of far-reaching economic and institutional reform, which will include both short-term fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment measures and medium- to long-term structural and institutional changes. Energy subsidies and the low retirement age are the two critical policy areas that require adjustment to avoid sovereign default and a balance-of-payments crisis.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict. EPC Commentary, 7 April 2016

When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.