Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

Political economy of the Agenda 2010 reforms: How Gerhard Schröder overcame the "blocked republic". ACES Cases No. 2008.3

This essay will show that the Schröder-led government managed to break the political gridlock and introduce the Agenda 2010 because key institutional structures of Germany‟s political economy had lost their obstructive powers. In other words, the formerly semi-sovereign state had reclaimed its sovereignty. To understand how this happened, Peter Katzenstein's concept of the semi-sovereign state is first explored as a framework through which to analyze economic policy continuity and change. Within this framework, the causes for constant reform inertia between 1982 and 2002, in spite of varying political constellations and changes in the country‟s economic structure, are then discussed. This analysis will demonstrate that the Agenda 2010 reforms are predominantly a result of underlying incremental change in the political economy and its effect on the political decision-making process. Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized and discussed with the aim of better understanding the economic policies of the current grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD government under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8