La Direttiva 2008/104/CE relativa al lavoro tramite agenzia interinale: aspetti problematici e modelli di implementazione = Directive 2008/104/EC relating to temporary agency work: problematic aspects and implementation models. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 101/2013

The problematic gestation of the Directive on temporary agency work shows the presence of several criticalities that there are also in the national transposition in relation to the principle of equal treatment and to the mechanisms for preventing abuse during successive assignments. From a first analysis it can be said that in some EU Member States only the derogations have been implemented and not the general principle of equal treatment. At the same time, the obligation of the Member States, contained in the Directive on temporary agency work, to establish mechanisms for preventing abuse during successive assignments is crucial, especially in the light of the recent case law of the EU Court of Justice in which the Court does not apply to the temporary agency workers the protective rules of the Directive on fixed-term contracts (see C-290/12 , Della Rocca).

Regulation of European Banks and Business Models: Towards a new paradigm? CEPS Paperbacks. June 2012

Amidst talks of establishing an EU-wide banking union, the recent changes in the regulatory framework and the rethinking of the future of European banking structure, the future of EU bank regulation is inextricably linked to banks’ business models. Using a sample of over 70 banks, which overlaps with those subjected to the EBA’s 2011 stress tests, this report emphasizes the key regulatory gaps that emerge from a comprehensive analysis of the soundness and performance of bank business models and provides policy-makers with guidance to reinforce the evolving regulatory framework in European banking.

Eurozone Crisis and Social Models: What We Can Learn from Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #20, 2013-2014

This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain ́s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.