33 resultados para Collective working experiences

em Archive of European Integration


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Cooperative and corporate farms have retained an important role for agricultural production in many transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this importance, these farms' ownership structure, and particularly the ownership's effect on their investment activity, which is vital for efficient restructuring and the sector's future development, are still not well understood. This paper explores the ownership-investment relationship using data on Czech farms from 1997 to 2008. We allow for ownership-specific variability in farm investment behaviour analyzed by utilizing an error-correction accelerator model. Empirical results suggest significant differences in the level of investment activity, responsiveness to market signals, investment lumpiness, as well as investment sensitivity to financial variables among farms with different ownership characteristics. These differences imply that the internal structure of the Czech cooperative and corporate farms will be developing in the direction of a decreasing number of owners and an increasing ownership concentration.

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In this study, the relationship between the country's level of literacy and its national culture will be explored. Cultural differences effect the way that people think and react. Culture is "the value shared amongst distinctive social groups and classes" (Soley and Pandya 2003, 206). House, et al. (2004, 57) define culture as "shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations." Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofstede (1991) considers culture to be "the collective programming of the mind. Culture is a stem of collectively held values" (Hofstede 1981, p. 240).

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This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.