l bilanciamento tra le libertà economiche e i diritti sociali collettivi operato dalla Corte di Giustizia è un contemperamento tra diritti equiordinati?* = The balance between economic freedoms and collective social rights and actions; Court of Justice is a choice between rights equiordinati? Actions by the Court of Justice. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 98/2012

In the Viking and Laval judgments and more recently in the Comm. v. Germany ruling, the Court of Justice applied the proportionality test to collective rights, setting a series of restrictions to the exercise of the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining. The way the ECJ balances the economic freedoms and the social rights is indeed very different from that of the Italian Constitutional Court. Unlike the European Union Treaties, the Italian Constitution recognizes an important role to the right to take collective action which has to be connected with article 3, paragraph 2, consequently the right of strike is more protected than the exercise of economic freedoms.

Why firms avoid cutting wages: Survey evidence from European firms. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 251, December 2013

The rarity with which firms reduce nominal wages has been frequently observed, even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why they avoid cutting wages. Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in euro area countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in non-euro area countries. The paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.

Why Are German Employers Associations Declining? A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.3, 2005

This paper challenges the conventional explanation for declining density of German employers associations. The dominant account asserts that German trade unions have taken advantage of increased globalization since the 1980s which has made internationally active enterprises more vulnerable to production disruptions to extract additional monopoly rents from multinational employers via aggressive collective bargaining. Small firms have responded to the increased union pressures by avoiding membership employers associations, which has produced the density declines. Data, however, disconfirm the conventional explanation; compensation increases have actually become increasingly smaller over the decades. This paper presents an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data. We argue that it is the large product manufacturers rather than the trade unions that have greatly increased price pressures on parts suppliers, which has led to a disproportionate number of suppliers to quit employers associations. The paper also discusses these findings in light of the "varieties of capitalism" literature. It points out that this literature has depicted national models as too homogeneous. The decision of several German employers associations to offer different classes of membership represents an accentuation of variety within national varieties of capitalism.

Wage inequality in Germany – What role does global trade play? Policy Brief #2015/03

Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 percent of the increase in wage inequality in Germany. Primarily, the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany plays a greater role – especially within industries. The decline in collective bargaining is the primary company-specific driver of wage inequality. Nevertheless, protectionist measures would not be effective for achieving greater wage equality.