The ICC Debate and the EU-U.S. Struggle for Influence: The Case of the Balkan-6. ACES Working Paper No. 11, October 2007

The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was such a case. It centered on whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries - Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia - decided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia - ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate.

U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007

The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of the high-tech sector. The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2016

Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.