8 resultados para Climate change mitigation
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
In 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 17% from 2005 levels. With the failure of Congress to adopt comprehensive climate legislation in 2010, the feasibility of the pledge was put in doubt. However, we find that the United States is near to reaching this goal: the country is currently on course to achieve reductions of 16.3% from 2005 levels in 2020. Three factors contribute to this outcome: greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act, secular trends including changes in relative fuel prices and energy efficiency and sub-national efforts. Perhaps even more surprising, domestic emissions are probably lower than would have been the case if the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal had become law in 2010. At this point, however, the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments under the Copenhagen Accord for 2020.
Resumo:
The EU has long assumed leadership in advancing domestic and international climate change policy. While pushing its partners in international negotiations, it has led the way in implementing a host of domestic measures, including a unilateral and legally binding target, an ambitious policy on renewable energy and a strategy for low-carbon technology deployment. The centrepiece of EU policy, however, has been the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade programme launched in 2005. The ETS has been seen as a tool to ensure least-cost abatement, drive EU decarbonisation and develop a global carbon market. After an initial review and revision of the ETS, to come into force in 2013, there was a belief that the new ETS was ‘future-proof’, meaning able to cope with the temporary lack of a global agreement on climate change and individual countries’ emission ceilings. This confidence has been shattered by the simultaneous ‘failure’ of Copenhagen to deliver a clear prospect of a global (top-down) agreement and the economic crisis. The lack of prospects for national caps at the international level has led to a situation whereby many member states hesitate to pursue ambitious climate change policies. In the midst of this, the EU is assessing its options anew. A number of promising areas for international cooperation exist, all centred on the need to ‘raise the ambition level’ of GHG emission reductions, notably in aviation and maritime, short-lived climate pollutions, deforestation, industrial competitiveness and green growth. Public policy issues in the field of technology and its transfer will require more work to identify real areas for cooperation.
Resumo:
The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. Although the competence for action in climate change is shared between the national governments and the supranational level of the European Union, on behalf of the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international climate change negotiations. The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) brought a number of changes to the institutional framework of the European Union, most significantly to the European Council and the external role of the EU. These changes appear to have added to the complexity which surrounds issues of the external representation of the EU and not simplified them – are there too many ‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? This paper questions the extent to which these changes will impact on the Commission headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate change policy and hence direction to the approach which the EU takes in global climate change politics.
Resumo:
This paper focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in the formation of India’s climate change policy; an increasingly high profile issue area. It is based on an extensive study of relevant literature, EU-India policy documents and the execution of thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts; many of whom have experienced EU-India cooperation on climate change first-hand. A three-point typology will be used to assess the extent of the EU’s leadership role, supporting role or equal partnership role in India, with several sub-roles within these categories. Further, for clarity and chronology purposes, three time periods will be distinguished to assess how India’s climate policy has evolved over time, alongside the EU’s role within that. The findings of the paper confirm that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles to some degree, although the EU-India relationship in climate policy is increasingly an equal partnership. It offers explanations for previous shortcomings in EU-India climate policy as well as policy recommendations to help ensure more effective cooperation and implementation of policies.
Resumo:
Drawing on his recent experience in the climate negotiations in Doha as an advisor and negotiator on a wide variety of issues, Andrei Marcu offers his assessment of the progress achieved in the two weeks of intensive talks. In spite of modest results, he describes the talks as an important and necessary step in the revolution, first ignited at the Montreal negotiations in 2005, that rejected the top-down Kyoto Protocol model in favour of a bottom-up climate change regime. In his view, the decisions taken in Doha enable the start of a new negotiating process aimed at delivering a new global climate agreement.