"Creeping" civil war in the North Caucasus. OSW Commentary No. 50, 2011-03-15

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service. Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by implementing development programmes have not brought the desired results, because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place. It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbouring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these republics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

Vanishing lines in the sand – Why a new map of the Middle East is necessary. CEPS Commentary, 1 October 2013

As the stalemate in Syria drags on, territorial divisions in the country are becoming more entrenched and the civil war is spreading to Syria’s neighbours; aggravating long-standing sectarian divisions in the whole region. In the view of Steven Blockmans, a lasting agreement cannot be reached in the Middle East if world powers stick to infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement in which France and the UK secretly dealt with what came to be called the ‘Syria Question’. Any way out of the quagmire will require a grand bargain – one that establishes a new order in the whole region and draws borders accordingly.

Ukrainians' EU migration prospects. OSW Commentary No. 128, 10.03.2014.

The political crisis in Ukraine, particularly the bloodshed seen on 18–20 February and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea, has sparked fears of another possible wave of immigrants heading to the EU. However, the country was partially politically stabilised (at least in its central and western parts), and this has made the scenario of a mass migration of people from Ukraine rather unlikely. If there is no civil war in Ukraine, any further development of the political situation in Ukraine may have only an indirect impact on the actual migration. Should the political instability continue, the Ukrainian economy remain in recession while jobs are available for Ukrainian immigrants in the EU, then an increase in the migration of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, including Poland, would be possible. In the short term there may be two characteristic groups of immigrants: (1) young people who will attempt to leave Ukraine for good due to the lack of job opportunities; (2) circulating migrants, mainly from western Ukraine, who will be looking for temporary jobs. Only if the economic downturn trend and political turmoil in Ukraine continues for a longer time, will settlement migration increase.

Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.

Kazakhstan: the regional success story; Tajikistan: a trial period; Uzbekistan: the major source of instability in Central Asia? OSW Study 15/2004

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan can boast economic development like no other country in Central Asia. In contrast to other countries of the region, which have rich natural resources, Kazakhstan has managed to use its economic potential in a way that yields concrete benefits now and, at the same time, creates prospects for further sustainable economic growth. Tajikistan: Tajikistan in its present state has been built on the civil war experiences and provisions of the peace accords signed in 1997. These have had a great impact on the present form of the state, its political scene and power mechanisms. President Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in the state. The political system, which he has cocreated, is based on - unique in this region - political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic party), decentralisation (far-going independence of the regions and relatively limited potential of the central structures) and compromise as the basic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation of the country. Uzbekistan: With its geographic location, potential, ambitions and political priorities, Uzbekistan could play a leading role in Central Asia. The international community has perceived the country as the pillar of stability in the region. This perception was further reinforced after 11th September 2001 and was certainly among the factors that inspired the United States to start closer political and military cooperation with Tashkent. The administration in Washington had expected that closer contacts might galvanise political, economic and social change in Uzbekistan, thus reinforcing positive trends in other countries of the region as well. But the relations between Washington and Tashkent are in crisis (which the United States will certainly try to overcome), and we have seen rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia and China.

Syria: An end to the hands-off policy. CEPS Commentary, 31 August 2015

After a year of focusing on the nuclear deal with Iran, international diplomacy is returning to consider resolution of the civil war in Syria, with each side now a little less firm in their positions as the situation on the ground deteriorates further. In this new CEPS Commentary Steven Blockmans sheds light on the highly complex and volatile environment in the Middle East, concluding that failure to seize the new diplomatic momentum to resolve this conflict will likely mean that Syria falls into the hands of IS.

Flashlight Europe N°2–February 2015. “Europe must now get involved in a very big way”

More than three years after al-Gaddafi was overthrown, Libya has still not returned to some semblance of normality. In many places, the Libyan state exists only on paper. No less than two governments and dozens of rival tribes, all with their own militias and armed to the teeth, are trying to come to power. In the midst of this chaos “IS,” the terrorist organization, has now entered the fray. Evidence of this is provided by the brutal murder of 21 Egyptian Copts, which could trigger off a civil war that will pose a threat to the entire region and to Europe. Mirco Keilberth, an expert on Libya, explains what is going on.

My enemy’s enemy–Turkey’s stance on Islamic State. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 198/24.02.2016

In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accusations over the past few months.

The Basque Diaspora in Latin America: Euskal Etxeak, Integration, and Tensions. EDAP 1/2016

The establishment of the Basque diaspora in Latin America can be divided in several different periods. First, from the 16th to 18th century, the so-called original diaspora of Basques who were part of the Spanish colonial regime. The second can be traced to the 19th century, consisting of a mixture of impoverished Basque migrants seeking jobs, especially in Uruguay and Argentina, and of refugees fleeing from the Spanish War of Independence and the Carlist wars. The third wave is identified by, but not only through, the considerable amount of refugees from the Spanish Civil War on the 1930's. The fourth wave came during the 1970s, with refugees from the Franco Dictatorship, ETA members and sympathisers. In this paper I will argue that each new wave of migrants brought tension to the diaspora, with the Euskal Etxeak, or ‘Basque houses’, as a focus point. The main idea is to analyse the different tensions and political discussions of this set of diasporic waves in Latin America.