The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are different but more effective accountability mechanisms.