Linking Policy and Practice:The Case of EU-UNICEF Cooperation on the Rights of the Child in Third Countries. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2013

This Working Paper offers detailed analysis of EU-UNICEF cooperation on the rights of the child in the European Union's external relations, in particular as regards linkages between the EU policy priorities and concrete actions to advance the protection and promotion of child rights in third countries. It addresses a number of crucial questions: how has the EU’s external policy on the rights of the child developed over the past decade, what were these developments influenced by and what role did UNICEF play in these processes; what is the legal and policy framework for EU-UNICEF cooperation in foreign policy and what added-value it brings; what mechanisms are used by the EU and UNICEF to improve child rights protection in third countries and what are the motivations behind their field cooperation. The study starts by examining the development of the EU’s foreign policy on the rights of the child and covers the legal basis enshrined in EU treaties, the policy framework, and the implementation instruments and then investigates the evolution of the EU’s relations with the United Nations. The paper focuses on the EU’s cooperation with UNICEF by looking into the legal and political framework for EU-UNICEF relations, the policy-oriented cooperation and joint implementation of projects on the ground in third countries. This section outlines the rationale behind the practical cooperation as well as the factors for success and obstacles hindering the delivery of sustainable results. Finally, the Working Paper concludes with suggestions on how EU-UNICEF cooperation could be further enhanced following recent developments, namely the 2012 EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights as well as human rights country strategies.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

The EU's External Action towards the Middle East: Resolution required. CEPS Commentary, 7 January 2012

Among the many foreign policy challenges the EU will have to address this year, such as cultivating workable ties with Ukraine, Russia and other neighbours in the east, reviving the transatlantic partnership in trade, rebalancing alliances with Asian countries, and pooling and sharing defence capabilities, the number one challenge that will take up most of the Foreign Affairs Council’s time is the Middle East. After months of half-baked unilateral attempts at resolving the foreign policy challenges posed by this troubled region, the moment has now come for the EU to take bold and concrete action, argues CEPS Senior Fellow Steven Blockmans in this new Commentary.

A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union. EPC Discussion Paper, 13 July 2016

On 28 June 2016, just a few days after the historic Brexit vote, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini presented the paper on the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) at the European Council, outlining the strategic coordinates for the EU’s foreign and security policy. In this Discussion Paper, Giovanni Grevi takes a closer look at the EUGS and assesses its main rationale, features, added value and prospects against the backdrop of an ever more complex world. Not only is the EU dealing with increasingly contested and polarised politics at home, but the global theatre itself has become hugely disorienting, more integrated and yet more fragmented at the same time. The paper recalibrates the overall foreign policy posture of the EU and sketches out a more modest and concrete approach compared to earlier aspirations, and a more joined-up one compared to current practice. By doing so, the strategy seeks to square the circle between the need for Europe to be cohesive and purposeful in a harder strategic environment and the fact that domestic politics within the Union constrain its external action and drain its attractiveness. The EUGS calls on the EU and member states to fully take on their responsibility to underpin unity, prosperity and security at home by taking more effective and joined-up action abroad. The question is, of course, whether this call will be heeded.