Policy Options for Improving the Functioning and Efficiency of the Digital Single Market in the Field of Copyright. CEPS Special Report No. 121, 19 November 2015

This study explores the existing policy problems and the possible options for reforming the EU copyright framework as provided by EU Directive 29/2001 on Copyright in the Information Society (InfoSoc Directive) and related legislation, with a specific focus on the need to strengthen the Internal Market for creative content. We find two main policy problems: i) the absence of a Digital Single Market for creative works; and ii) the increasing tension between the current system of exceptions and limitations and the legal treatment of emerging uses of copyrighted content in the online environment. Without prejudicing a future impact assessment that might focus on more specific and detailed policy options, our analysis suggests that ‘more Europe’ would be needed in the field of copyright, given the existing sources of productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency associated with the current system. Looking at copyright from an Internal Market perspective would, in this respect, also help to address many of the shortcomings in the current framework, which undermine legal certainty and industrial policy goals.

Do Institutional Changes Make a Difference? A veto player analysis of how institutional changes in the Council of the EU influence legislative efficiency and outputs. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 31, October 2013

A driving argument behind recent EU treaty reforms was that more qualified majority voting (QMV) was required to reduce the potential dangers of legislative paralysis caused by enlargement. Whilst existing literature on enlargement mostly focuses on the question of what changed in the legislative process after the 2004 enlargement, the question of why these changes occurred has been given far less attention. Through the use of a single veto player theoretical model, this paper seeks to test and explain whether enlargement reduces the efficiency of the legislative process and alters the type of legislation produced, and whether QMV can compensate for these effects. In doing this, it offers a theoretical explanation as to why institutional changes that alter the level of cohesion between actors in the Council have an influence over both the legislative process and its outcomes.