Performance of Long-Term Care Systems in Europe. ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, 21 December 2012

This report evaluates the performance of long-term care (LTC) systems in Europe, with a special emphasis on four countries that were selected in Work Package 1 of the ANCIEN project as representative of different LTC systems: Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. Based on a performance framework, we use the following four core criteria for the evaluation: the quality of life of LTC users, the quality of care, equity of LTC systems and the total burden of LTC (consisting of the financial burden and the burden of informal caregiving). The quality of life is analysed by studying the experience of LTC users in 13 European countries, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Older persons with limitations living at home have the highest probability of receiving help (formal or informal) in Germany and the lowest in Poland. Given that help is available, the sufficiency of the help is best ensured in Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands. The indirectly observed properties of the LTC system are most favourable in France. An older person who considers all three aspects important might be best off living in Belgium or Switzerland. The horizontal and vertical equity of LTC systems are analysed for the four representative countries. The Dutch system scores highest on overall equity, followed by the German system. The Spanish and Polish systems are both less equitable than the Dutch and German systems. To show how ageing may affect the financial burden of LTC, projections until 2060 are given for LTC expenditures for the four representative countries. Under the base scenario, for all four countries the proportions of GDP spent on public and private LTC are projected to more than double between 2010 and 2060, and even treble in some cases. The projections also highlight the large differences in LTC expenditures between the four countries. The Netherlands spends by far the most on LTC. Furthermore, the report presents information for a number of European countries on quality of care, the burden of informal caregiving and other aspects of performance. The LTC systems for the four representative countries are evaluated using the four core criteria. The Dutch system has the highest scores on all four dimensions except the total burden of care, where it has the second-best score after Poland. The German system has somewhat lower scores than the Dutch on all four dimensions. The relatively large role for informal care lowers the equity of the German system. The Polish system excels in having a low total burden of care, but it scores lowest on quality of care and equity. The Spanish system has few extreme scores. Policy implications are discussed in the last chapter of this report and in the Policy Brief based on this report.

‘Wrong number?’ The Use and Misuse of Asylum Data in the European Union. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 69/December 2014

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an EU policy area that is particularly evocative of the ‘politics of numbers’. The European Union has at its disposal a wide array of sources providing detailed information about the capacities and pressures of its member states’ asylum systems. This paper discusses the content of asylum data and the evolving interaction between its different sources, ranging from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the European Commission’s EUROSTAT and DG HOME, the European Asylum Support Office, FRONTEX, the European Migration Network (EMN) and national databases. However, the way in which such data are often misused, or even omitted, in political debate affects the soundness of policy decisions in the CEAS. Drawing on debates over the contested phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’ and the exemption of victims of torture and unaccompanied minors from accelerated and border procedures in the recast asylum procedures Directive, this briefing paper argues that solid data-based evidence is often absent from political negotiations on CEAS measures affecting refugees and asylum-seekers.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Prepared for a Symposium on Country Development at the European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vienna, Austria, April 2012 (Untitled). ACES Working Papers, April 2012

In Kazakhstan doctoral students are not expected to make a contribution to knowledge, as is required at Western universities. Rather, their task is to become familiar with what is known and then make policy recommendations for Kazakhstan. For example, how can the human capital in Kazakhstan be improved? This is a very broad subject for a PhD dissertation. However, it does require a holistic perspective, and such dissertation topics may create an opportunity for systems scientists. When Russell Ackoff created the Social Systems Sciences PhD program at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, he had his students solve practical problems for business or government managers. That program graduated a large number of people who became consultants. A few became academics in several countries. The program created a philosophy and methods for holistic management. Large issues in developing countries may be a source of clients for systems scientists who want to further develop philosophy, theories and methods by working with large social systems.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 180/26.08.2015

On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery systems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group in the aerospace industry. While work on finalising the merger was underway, the German government was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. However, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, including also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new companies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn.

Aftermath of the Maidan. Ukrainian society two years after the revolution. OSW Commentary Number 199/04.03.2016

Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, it is clear that hopes of a quick reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukrainian state as a political and institutional system have not been fulfilled. The resistance of the bureaucrats, politicians and oligarchs who make up the informal, corrupt systems has proven to be very strong, and the will of part of the political elite and the EU and the United States to implement the procedures they have suggested has proved insufficient. If not for the war and the economic collapse, which forced Kyiv to seek external financial assistance and political support, the modernisation of the state would have proceeded even more slowly and with yet greater difficulty.