Two Boats in the Mediterranean and their Unfortunate Encounters with Europe’s Policies towards People on the Move. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 48, 20 July 2012

Two stark reminders of the difficulties that people on the move encounter in the Mediterranean have been grabbing headlines recently: the so-called ‘left-to-die’ boat report and the ground-breaking Hirsi judgment. These two instances present the worst of both worlds: the first concerns a migrant boat that was ignored altogether, resulting in many deaths, whereas the second concerns a migrant boat being intercepted but subsequently dealt with in a way that contradicts Europe’s human rights standards. These two cases are neither isolated nor incidental. Instead they are of wider concern to the EU and reminders of structural deficiencies in Europe’s approach to people on the move in the Mediterranean. This paper identifies those cross-cutting deficiencies and proposes recommendations to correct them.

The government Europe deserves? CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2014

Leaders of the EU’s institutions have to be political entrepreneurs if they are to leave a mark on history. Their decision-making power is limited, but they can often frame the choices and broker coalitions to push the existing boundaries of European integration. This Commentary by Daniel Gros finds that none of the EU’s top three new faces – Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk or Federica Mogherini – has a track record in this sense. In his view, the most sobering message from the whole appointment process is that the member states’ leaders will not suffer anyone who might rock the boat and push integration forward. That there will be little movement towards the “ever-closer union” envisioned in the Treaty of Rome might come as a relief for those fearing domination by Brussels (like many in the UK), but it can only dismay those who hope that, despite its sluggish economy and declining population, Europe can become a relevant global actor.

Migration in the Central Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 02/2013

In the last decade irregular immigration has emerged as a “security” challenge (in the language of International Relations military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region particularly in the central, sub-region1. The designation of this issue as a “security challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial and will be discussed further down. This paper focuses on the situation in the central Mediterranean involving mainly four countries namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of which have long standing historic links and bilateral relations and participate in the so called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean. Two of these Central Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are EU member states and Tunisia has a long standing relationship with the EU [Association Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya so far has no formal relations at all with the EU. This paper analyses some of the aspects of migration in the central Mediterranean focusing on the link between the domestic and international politics of the issue in Italy and Malta and contrasting the different approaches taken. For example, although Italy and Malta both resort to self-help and both try to involve the EU in helping them tackle the problem, they do this in a markedly different way: Italy uses the EU as a supplement to its independent and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the EU as the major solution to the problem. Lacking the power and influence to deal with the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as primarily a multilateral issue or one that can only be tackled in concert with stronger powers in the region preferably within an EU context. On the other hand, Italy has been keen in involving the EU but decided to go it alone when this option turned out to be a dead end. In this paper I also try to show the extent (or limitations) to which multilateral initiatives such as the “5+5” and Euro operation really play a decisive role in incentivizing or facilitating inter-state cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity (norms) and the extent to which it is implemented as well as a number of connected issues. The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean Boat People, have been referred to by various names in the literature, all of which may be more or less deficient in actually defining them all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or “irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of international protection, “migrants at sea” and “boat people”. The use of “boat people” dispenses with the need of having to define the various categories of migrants involved and is thus preferred in this paper.

EU Borders and Their Controls: Preventing unwanted movement of people in Europe? CEPS Essay No. 6, 14 November 2013

his Essay attempts to take a step back from the tragic event in the first week of October 2013, when a boat capsized off the Italian island of Lampedusa and some 300 persons drowned seeking safe harbour. It sets out to examine the issue of EU border controls from the perspectives of the technologies, new and old, building on a variety of scholarly disciplines to understand what is happening to border controls on the movement of persons in the EU and why the results are so deadly. The Essay opens with an overview of what actually happens at the EU’s external borders. It then moves on to assess the old and new set of border control technologies that are deployed at the EU external borders, and how new technologies such as those based on automated controls and biometrics, are transforming the classical principles of European border controls. It then covers the reasons why people are refused admission at the EU’s external borders and the extent to which new border and surveillance technologies would assist in the effective controls in light of EU border law. Conclusions are finally offered on the articulation between the facts of EU border controls on persons and the claims and proposals for new technologies that are emerging from the EU institutions.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.