British business and the Euro. ACES Cases No. 2008.2

During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the United Kingdom obtained an opt-out option on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). When Tony Blair came to power, he promised there would be a referendum on the euro if the government decided it was in the national interest to join. Many believed Tony Blair intended to call and try to win a referendum on the euro. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the debate over the euro raged in Britain, filling the pages of the tabloids and the minds of many Britons. In this paper based on empirical research conducted in London in 2005-06, I investigate whether the business sector had a clear preference on the issue of British membership in the EMU and tried to influence the government‟s decision. I use Jeffry Frieden's model of interest group preferences regarding exchange-rate policies to develop hypotheses regarding the position of the business sector on the euro. Research findings reveal that the business sector was divided on the issue of euro membership exactly as Frieden's model predicts. However, the intensity of business preferences decreased overtime. By the end of Tony Blair's second term, the business sector had become neutral on the issue of the euro.

Repurposing Globalization: Discourse and Political Strategy in New Labour Britain. ACES Working Papers, 2012

As elsewhere in Europe and around the world, the discourse of globalization in the United Kingdom—the particular representation of the world as undergoing an epochal shift away from the traditional autonomy of the nation-state—has powerfully reshaped political debate. And this has had important distributional effects on the balance of power in the political party system, most notably in the return to power of the Labour Party as “New Labour” under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. But while it is known that articulations of globalization are embedded in the political system, a systematic analysis linking such discourse with party competition is lacking. In this paper, I propose that many features of the globalist language invoked by New Labour can be explained in terms of concrete strategic aims. Working with concepts of “heresthetics” and “bricolage” drawn from a synthesis of literatures, I illustrate this approach through several representative texts. These findings are then used to make predictions about the kind of globalization discourse to expect in the communications of two nationalist parties in the UK—“least likely” cases for globalism—which can be explored further as part of a larger research program.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.