164 resultados para Bilateral Cooperation
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.
Resumo:
Germany perceives the Eastern Partnership as an initiative that is conducive to German interests, but at the same time as one that could undermine them. Berlin would like the Eastern Partnership to be an instrument that brings the partner countries closer to the EU economically but not politically. Germany has opted for a tightening of the economic cooperation with the partner countries, by signing deals on deep free trade areas and harmonising part of the legislation of these countries with the acquis communautaire. On the other hand, Germany does not want the Eastern Partnership to evolve and turn into an initiative that offers the partner countries prospects of membership and antagonises Russia. Therefore Germany is trying to counteract any elements of the Eastern Partnership that would help it develop in the aforementioned direction. Moreover, Germany has set its own bilateral cooperation with partner countries in the east above the joint projects of the Eastern Partnership. In doing so, Berlin’s guiding principle is that German money allocated for the projects on development cooperation in the east should bring political and economic benefits first of all to Germany.
Resumo:
This policy paper focuses on the sustainable management of some key natural resources in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under climate change and anthropogenic pressures. In a business-as-usual and even more so in a failed cooperation scenario, water resources, ecosystems and biodiversity in the region are under stress, with negative consequences for agriculture, food security, tourism and development. However, proper adaptation strategies are shown to be effective in reconciling resource conservation with GDP, trade and population growth. These need be implemented in different ways: technological, institutional, behavioural; and at different levels: regional, national and international. There is ample room for fruitful cooperation between the EU and SEMCs in this area, which can take the form of EU direct financial and technical support when resources in SEMCs are scarce, and of multilateral and bilateral cooperation programmes to improve resource efficiency. The EU could also take on the role of coordinating these different bilateral actions and, at the same time, support SEMCs to establish a structured programme focused on the communication and dissemination of emerging best practices.
Resumo:
Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and at the end of the first mandate of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), this analysis provides an in-depth view of the on-going institutional socialisation between Member State Embassies and EU Delegations. Specifically, it focuses on the Member States’ perceptions of the role of EU Delegations. These perceptions can back up or restrain the EU Delegations in fulfilling their mandate. More precisely, the paper examines to what extent the socialisation between EU Delegations and EU Member State Embassies helps the Delegations to fulfil their mandate in bilateral diplomacy. It argues that EU Delegations are still under dynamic processes of institutional socialisation with the Member States’ Embassies which increasingly accept and expect EU Delegations’ actions. The post-Lisbon context of EU Diplomacy is consolidating a primus inter pares role of Delegations being central hubs coordinating and implementing EU policies on the spot.