How much does EU citizenship cost? The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair: A breakthrough for sincere cooperation in citizenship of the union? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 64, April/2014

How much does European citizenship cost in the EU? This was the question that has raised so much controversy over the Maltese citizenship-for-sale programme. The outright selling of Maltese nationality to rich foreigners led to unprecedented responses by the European Parliament and European Commission. This paper examines the affair and its relevance for current and future configurations of citizenship of the EU. It studies the extent to which member states are still free to lay down the grounds for the acquisition and loss of nationality without any EU supervision and accountability. It provides a comparative overview of member state schemes and the exact price for buying citizenship and a residency permit in the EU. It is argued that the EU’s intervention on the Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair constitutes a legal precedent for assessing the lawfulness of passport-for-sale or golden migration programmes in other EU member states. The affair has also revealed the increasing relevance of a set of European and international legal principles limiting member states’ discretion over citizenship matters and providing a supranational constellation of accountability venues scrutinising the impact of their decisions over citizenship of the Union. The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair has placed at the forefront the EU general principle of sincere cooperation in nationality matters. Member states’ actions in the citizenship domain cannot negatively affect in substance the concept and freedoms of European citizenship. That notwithstanding, the European institutions’ insistence on the need for Maltese nationality law to require a ‘genuine link’ in the form of an effective residence criteria for any rich applicants to benefit from the fast-track naturalisation poses a fundamental dilemma from the angle of Union citizenship: what is this genuine link really about? And what is precisely ‘habitual’, ‘effective’ or ‘functional’ residence? It is argued that by supporting the ‘real connections’ as the most relevant standard, the European institutions may be paradoxically fuelling nationalistic misuses by member states of the ‘genuine link’ as a way to justify restrictive integration policies on the acquisition of nationality.

What prospects for transport infrastructure and impacts on growth in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries? MEDPRO Report No. 3, February 2013

Lack of adequate infrastructure is a significant inhibitor to increased trade of the countries of the Mediterranean region. Bringing their transport infrastructure to standards comparable with countries of a similar per capita GDP will be costly but worthwhile. We compare the current quantities of six types of transport infrastructure with international benchmarks, and estimate the additional quantities needed to reach the benchmarks. We also estimate the cost of that infrastructure and express it as a percentage of GDP. Finally we make tentative estimates of how much trade might be generated and how this might impact on GDP. All the estimates are made for 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under four scenarios. The greatest need for additional infrastructure is for airport passenger terminals (between 52% and 56%), whereas the least is for more unpaved roads (between 7% and 13%). The investment (including maintenance) cost would be between 0.9% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP, although the investments in some countries would be between 1.4% and 4.5% of GDP. The impact on non-oil international trade would be substantial, but with differences between imports and exports. The overall trade balance of the 11 countries would be an improvement of between 5.4% and 17.2%, although some countries would continue to have a negative balance. A final assessment is made of the benefit ratio between the increase in GDP and the cost of transport investment. This varies between about 3 and 8, an indication of the high return to be expected from increased investment in transport infrastructure.

Mutual Recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 24/June 2012

Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep' market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods, mutual recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for EU Member States. This BEER paper attempts to explain the rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU internal goods market, its working in actual practice for about three decades now, culminating in a qualitative cost/benefit analysis and its recent improvement in terms of 'governance' in the so-called New Legislative Framework (first denoted as the 2008 Goods package) thereby ameliorating the benefits/costs ratio. For new (in contrast to existing) national regulation, the intrusive EU procedure to impose mutual recognition is presented as well, with basic data so as to show its critical importance to keep the internal goods market free. All this is complemented by a short summary of the scant economic literature on mutual recognition. Subsequently, the analysis is extended to the internal market for services. This is done in two steps, first by reminding the debate on the origin principle (which goes further than mutual recognition EU-style) and how mutual recognition works under the horizontal services directive. This is followed by a short section on how mutual recognition works in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services markets.