The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

Flexibility clauses in the Stability and Growth Pact: No need for revision. CEPS Policy Brief No. 319, 24 July 2014

This Policy Brief offers an in-depth review of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and looks at whether the margins of flexibility within existing rules are sufficient in the current climate of low growth, or whether there is a need to broaden them. The issue is especially relevant as the changing economic environment is raising fresh questions about whether the EU’s current common economic policies are able to manage dismal growth and low inflation. The fragile state of confidence in financial markets and the unresolved but inevitable questions of moral hazard linked to lax fiscal policies mean that no large-scale fiscal expansion to support the recovery of economic activity is feasible. The discussion may therefore only concern the scope within the SGP to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and to provide room for the implementation of structural reforms. Here, we analyse the flexibility clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact under three headings; namely “exceptional circumstances”, “structural reforms and other relevant factors”, and the “investment clause”. Recommendation: Our main conclusion is that the SGP contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and has the margins needed to finance structural reforms during the transition to the new regime. We therefore see no need to change the existing rules of the SGP. We believe that the ongoing debate about a fresh growth strategy for the eurozone and the European Union would greatly benefit from removing from the Council table ill-formulated and unnecessary demands for greater flexibility in the SGP.

Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making. CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, 25 July 2014

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, Steven Blockmans asks what it will take before the EU is able to confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy. With numerous competing national interests and some member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the author makes a number of recommendations for policy-makers.

Agricultural Labour Market Flexibility in the EU and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Document No. 49, June 2013

Factor markets that function well are a crucial condition for the competitiveness and growth of agriculture. Institutions and regulation may give rise to agricultural labour market heterogeneity, which could have important effects on the functioning of the labour market and other agricultural factor markets in EU member states. This paper first defines the institutional framework for the labour market, and then presents a brief literature review of previous studies of labour market institutional frameworks. Based on the literature, a survey to characterise agricultural labour markets was undertaken, which was implemented for a selection of EU27 and EU candidate countries, with responses based on expert opinion. The survey data were then used to construct indices of labour market flexibility/rigidity for the countries examined. These indices were used to make inter-country labour market comparisons and to draw inferences about the institutions and functioning of the agricultural labour market.

The New Deal with the United Kingdom: the Downside of Flexibility. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 38/2016

This paper examines the proposals listed by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in response to the letter sent by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, asking for a fresh settlement concerning the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. The paper reviews the nature and possible consequences of the “substantial changes” that were demanded in the areas of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration.

Flexibility versus Stability: A difficult trade-off in the eurozone. CEPS Working Document No. 422, 29 April 2016

Optimal currency area (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing eurozone countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour markets more flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When shocks are the result of business-cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts. This paper provides empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the eurozone were the result of business-cycle movements. These were relatively well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise business cycles should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, with consideration given to the implications for the governance of the eurozone.