The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region from Germany’s perspective. OSW Commentary No. 69, 2011-01-10

Germany is one of the eight EU member states which participate in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region along with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. Germany had a positive approach to the EUSBSR strategy (see Appendix 1) right from planning stage. This project contributed to the continuation of Germany’s co-operation with the countries in this region, which has been conducted since the mid 1980s mainly by German federal states. Germany is playing a major role as part of this strategy because it is the coordinator of its three priority areas.However, the German federal government sees the EUSBSR as a project to be implemented at the level of federal states. This has been proven by the great activity of three German federal states participating in the strategy (Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein) and at the same time the low level of engagement from the Bundestag, the federal government and expert circles. Furthermore, federal states more often formulate evaluations of the effects of co-operation achieved so far as part of the EUSBSR. Still, the relatively low level of Berlin’s engagement does not mean that it is not interested in co-operation in the Baltic region as such. Germany actively participates in the work of such bodies as the Council of the Baltic Sea States or the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM). All German entities engaged in the strategy make its future attractiveness and the success of individual projects as part of it dependent on including Russia in the EUSBSR. As long as Germany has the opportunity of regional co-operation with Russia at other forums (for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States), it is unlikely to become more engaged in developing the strategy and enhancing co-operation as part of this project.

Sitting on the fence: Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 33, April 2013

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula. From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden. In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.