Measuring competitiveness in Europe: resource allocation, granularity and trade. Bruegel Blueprint Series Volume XVIV, January 2016

One of the most important lessons learned during the 2008-09 financial crisis was that the informational toolbox on which policymakers base their decisions about competitiveness became outdated in terms of both data sources and data analysis. The toolbox is particularly outdated when it comes to tapping the potential of micro data for the analysis of competitiveness – a serious problem given that it is firms, rather than countries that compete on global markets.

European Monetary Union: between the stakeholder and the stockholder models of capitalism. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 01.3, 2001

From the mid-1980s on a new attitude towards self-determination appeared in Western European integration. With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and, later, with theAmsterdam Treaty of 1997 the member countries of the European Community manifested their determination to be active players in the new international order. Accepting and instituting the single market and monetary union constituted, however, a challenge of compatibility between the traditional model of welfare European capitalism and the impositions coming from globalization under the neo-liberal model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. This issue is examined here under two perspectives. The first reviews the implications which globalization has had on the European model of capitalism and the second the complications for monetary management as Europe moves from a nationally regulated to a union regulated financial structure.

Sustainability, Resource Efficiency and Competitiveness. An Assessment of Resource Efficiency Policies in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER) 32/2015.

Addressing high and volatile natural resource prices, uncertain supply prospects, reindustrialization attempts and environmental damages related to resource use, resource efficiency has evolved into a highly debated proposal among academia, policy makers, firms and international financial institutions (IFIs). In 2011, the European Union (EU) declared resource efficiency as one of its seven flagship initiatives in its Europe 2020 strategy. This paper contributes to the discussions by assessing its key initiative, the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (EC 2011 571), following two streams of evaluation. In a first step, resource efficiency is linked to two theoretical frameworks regarding sustainability, (i) the sustainability triangle (consisting of economic, social and ecological dimensions) and (ii) balanced sustainability (combining weak and strong sustainability). Subsequently, both sustainability frameworks are used to assess to which degree the Roadmap follows the concept of sustainability. It can be concluded that it partially respects the sustainability triangle as well as balanced sustainability, primarily lacking a social dimension. In a second step, following Steger and Bleischwitz (2009), the impact of resource efficiency on competitiveness as advocated in the Roadmap is empirically evaluated. Using an Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data model reveals no robust impact of resource efficiency on competiveness in the EU between 2004 and 2009 – a puzzling result. Further empirical research and enhanced data availability are needed to better understand the impacts of resource efficiency on competitiveness on the macroeconomic, microeconomic and industry level. In that regard, strengthening the methodologies of resource indicators seem essential. Last but certainly not least, political will is required to achieve the transition of the EU-economy into a resource efficient future.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.