22 resultados para Authoritarian
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Four decades of the EU's group-to-group dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean grouping of countries and with ASEAN have produced different dynamics and outcomes, despite the EU’s common strategy to use economic soft power to achieve their goals for the partnerships. Diverging conditions in the two regions created inconsistency in the EU's application of the common approach. The EU's neighbourhood security concerns forced it to relax its political stand with their Southern Mediterranean partners. For ASEAN, geographical distance dilutes the EU’s security concerns it that region and has afforded the EU to be more ideological and assertive on democracy and human rights practices. These issues have provoked disagreements in EU-ASEAN dialogues, but both sides have also tried to remain pragmatic in order to achieve some progress in the partnership. In contrast, the protracted the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to hamper the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, resulting in little progress. Social upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean also brought their partnership to a standstill. The EU's cooperation with former authoritarian regimes like Libya and Syria have only caused damage to its credibility in the Southern Mediterranean, and future Euro-Mediterranean dialogues are likely to be affected by it.
Resumo:
At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.
Resumo:
On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.
Resumo:
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West, launched two decades ago, has helped it become a relatively strong and ambitious actor on the international stage. It has become a key country in the region from the Western (USA and the EU) and Turkish points of view, as well as an important partner in the energy sector. The strategic EU concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, also supported by the United States, is among the initiatives based on cooperation with Azerbaijan. Surprisingly, however, Azerbaijan’s increased ambition and importance have caused its policy to diverge ever farther from the expectations and plans formulated by the West. The changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, occurring in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, have forced Azerbaijan to revise its assessment of its position in the region. The main impetus for Azerbaijan’s actions is fear of Russia, as well as the weakness of the West which has become particularly apparent in the recent stages of the Ukrainian crisis. Azerbaijan’s actions so far have displayed its tendency to deepen its self-isolation in foreign affairs and consolidate its authoritarian system. This comes as a challenge to the West, whose ability to shape its relations with Azerbaijan has weakened considerably. This state of affairs poses the threat that in the current situation, the Southern Gas Corridor concept, which Azerbaijan amended in 2012 in its own favour, might become totally blocked.
Resumo:
Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.
Resumo:
2009 may become a turning point in the history of post-Soviet Moldova. The country’s political class and society are faced with a fundamental choice. On the one hand, if the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, which has governed the country since 2001, remains in power, this would mean a consolidation of the authoritarian rule of the party leader Vladimir Voronin, perpetuation of the superficial nature of democratic institutions and a continuation of the manoeuvring between the European Union and Russia (with the increasing risk of falling into the latter’s exclusive zone of influence). On the other hand, the take over of political power by the opposition parties creates an opportunity for Moldova to resume building a democratic, pluralistic political system based on the rule of law and to develop closer links with the European Union within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership.
Resumo:
Belarus’s financial condition has visibly worsened since the beginning of this year. The severe falls in the country’s foreign currency reserves and its shortage of foreign currency on the international market pose an increasing threat to the stability of the Belarusian economy. Fearing an outbreak of public dissatisfaction, The government has so far been trying to avoid devaluing the rouble or structural economic reforms. Maintaining full control inside the country and the stability of the authoritarian regime are still the main concerns for President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. For this reason, the actions taken by the Belarusian government have been limited to imposing short-term administrative restrictions on the foreign currency market and obtaining external support in the form of loans. Given Belarus’s falling creditworthiness, Minsk is only able to ask Russia for financial support, thus offering the Kremlin more opportunities to realise its desire to take over strategic industrial plants in Belarus. However, the present economic problems of Belarus are so serious that no loan will be able to safeguard its government from the need of carrying out serious economic reforms.
Resumo:
Ukraine is a difficult partner for the West, and recently, it has been perceived as an enfant terrible because of the Kolchuga affair. Western and Polish press describe Ukraine as an authoritarian regime plagued by an internal crisis or even threatened by destabilisation. This picture is certainly one-sided and oversimplified, and it fails to accurately present the reality of Ukraine. Apart from experiencing definitely adverse political developments, Ukraine has also been successful in some ways in terms of its internal and foreign policies and the economy. At the same time, certain processes take place among the Ukrainian elites, that might be difficult to capture in social surveys, but may become the starting point for the future modernisation and democratisation of the country. To realise that there are some favourable aspects to the changes occurring in Ukraine is not to recognise Ukraine as a country heading to democratisation and a market economy in the Western sense. Still, it is worthwhile to understand that the positive developments, even if isolated, do occur in Ukraine and that they could be strengthened by adequate policies of the Ukrainian authorities and the Western states.
Resumo:
North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.
Resumo:
Ukraine saw hosting the European Football Championship as an important project in terms of image-building and modernisation from the very beginning. The country’s government assumed, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych alike, that Euro 2012 would provide a major impulse for economic development and show that the young Ukrainian state was capable of successfully preparing one of the most important sport tournaments in the world. Although UEFA’s decision raised eyebrows both in the West and in Ukraine, after initial delays the work gained momentum and, shortly before the championship, Ukraine’s progress could be evaluated as being satisfactory at the least. As part of the preparations, four stadiums were built or modernised, four airports in the host cities were developed and 1,600 km of roads were repaired or built from the ground up. The investments have doubtlessly contributed to an improvement of the infrastructure in Ukraine, but it would be rather inaccurate to say that Euro 2012 has brought about a real modernisation of the country. The funds allocated for the preparations were relatively modest, and part of them was spent in a non-transparent way, which gives rise to suspicions of corruption. The chance to improve Ukraine’s perception in the West has been to a great extent lost due to the trial of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in October 2011. Over the past few weeks, Euro 2012 as a sports event has been overshadowed by discussions among Western politicians and in the Western media about rising authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine. In turn, football is currently treated as a minor issue in Ukraine’s internal politics. The government has so far not used Euro 2012 to improve its popularity although hosting it is supported by a clear majority of the Ukrainian public. It is still an open question as to whether the Ukrainian government will try to capitalise politically on this sports event; this is especially significant as parliamentary elections are approaching.
Resumo:
In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.
Resumo:
The EU’s Central Asia Strategy approaches its fourth anniversary. In that time the EU has placed its relationship with Central Asia on a more structured footing. Although progress has been made in building dialogue and in furthering engagement, the strategy’s limitations are increasingly obvious. This brief argues that the driving force of the EU engagement should be based on a closer link between security and development. Engagement in this broad field should be underpinned by a values based approach that seeks to promote more explicitly reform on human rights, rule of law, governance and democracy. The momentous changes sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated that even the most apparently durable authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to sudden political shocks.
Resumo:
More than a year has passed since the start of the political uprising against the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. But, as demonstrated by the ongoing unrest in Syria, the process is far from over. Meanwhile, nations that have already rid themselves of their authoritarian rulers (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen), must decide where to go now and how to manage their political and economic transitions. To a lesser extent, a similar challenge is being faced by those constitutional monarchies (such as Morocco or Jordan) that accelerated reforms in order to avoid political destabilisation. Many politicians and experts, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, suggest that their Arab colleagues should learn from the post‐communist transition of the early 1990s. However, while learning from others’ experience is always a useful exercise, the geopolitical and socio‐economic context of the Arab revolution appears to be different, in many respects, from that of former Soviet bloc countries more than twenty years ago.
Resumo:
The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.
Resumo:
Usually, Germany’s social market economy is understood to embody a compromise between a liberal market order and a corporatist welfare state. While this reading of the German case is certainly not entirely wrong, this paper argues that only if we account for the close intellectual correspondence between lutheran Protestantism and economic liberalism on the one hand and between Catholicism and welfare corporatism on the other, can we fully comprehend the nature of the German post-war compromise. In particular, this perspective allows to better explain the anti-liberal undercurrents of Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft. It was especially the role which Protestant Ordoliberals ascribed to the state in upholding economic order and market discipline which accounts for the major difference between ‘classic’ and ‘German-style’ economic liberalism. Yet, the postwar economic order did not represent a deliberately struck compromise between the two major Christian denominations. Rather, Germany’s social market economy was the result of the failure of German Protestant Ordoliberals to prevent the reconstruction of the catholic Bismarckian welfare state after the authoritarian solution, which Ordoliberals had endorsed so strongly up until 1936 and from which they had hoped the re-inauguration of Protestant hegemony, had so utterly failed. Since the ordoliberal doctrine up to the present day lacks a clear understanding of the role of the corporatist welfare state within the German political economy, its insights into the functioning logic of German capitalism have remained limit. The paper also claims that accounting for the denominational roots of the postwar compromise allows us to better understand the relationship between consociationalism and corporatism in ‘Modell Deutschland’.