Putin's 'couldn't care less' attitude towards Russia's international commitments. CEPS Commentaries, 5 March 2014

By militarily invading and annexing Crimea, Russia has acted in breach of its obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Yet the Kremlin seems unfazed that it is violating general principles of international law. This seems emblematic for the ‘can’t care less’ attitude of Putin’s Russia. Moscow allows itself to be inconsistent with its own commitments and is reneging on its own words. This has all the trappings of a panicking dictatorship, which crushes dissent at home and portrays confidence in winning a great battle with enemies abroad. How can anyone now trust what Putin’s Russia says or commits to in the future?

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.

Kazakhstan's attitude towards integration with Russia: less love, more fear. OSW Commentary No. 137, 29.05.2014

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine have created a new context for Kazakhstan’s foreign and domestic policy. The ongoing crisis in the relations with Russia and the West has also changed the current order in the entire post-Soviet area. From Astana’s perspective, the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine can be considered dangerous since it shows Russia’s determination to interfere with the domestic affairs of its neighbours in the pursuit of its own interests. Furthermore, this policy reveals and raises the price a country needs to pay for its potential attempts to break free from the Russian zone of influence. At present the biggest challenge for the authorities in Astana is the accelerated implementation of the idea of the Eurasian Union promoted by Moscow, which is to be another stage in the integration of post-Soviet states (presently Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus). The signing of the Eurasian Union’s founding documents planned for late May 2014 and the launch of this organisation (scheduled for January 2015) is sure to bring Kazakhstan closer to Russia and simultaneously limit its economic and political independence. Nevertheless, Astana’s position in relations with Moscow will to a large extent depend on the new shape of the relations between Russia and China. China is pursuing its own strategic interests in Central Asia (including in the energy sector) and its main partner in the region is Kazakhstan. At the domestic level, Russia’s actions in Ukraine made the authorities in Astana fear that measures similar to those used in Ukraine could be applied towards Kazakhstan. On the one hand this has led to increased efforts aimed at consolidating the state and strengthening its structures, and on the other hand it has brought about a revision of those aspects of domestic policy which Russia could interpret as a pretext for interfering.

Reshaping politics of the left and centre in Greece after the 2014 EP election. EPIN Commentary No. 21/10 September 2014

The political landscape in Greece is confused and volatile at the moment; the right and extreme- right-wing parties are accorded a disproportionately large place in political debate, while the radical left-wing SYRIZA party is attempting to maintain a ‘leftist’ profile and demonstrate its capacity to govern through a strategy of image normalisation. These tensions make it very difficult for the Greek government to stick to the EU’s tough reform agenda. The governing coalition is trying to conceal the social effects of implementing structural policy reforms, even postponing some measures to avoid bearing their political cost. At the same time, it is adopting a very rushed, and thus quite worrying, attitude towards a fast-track growth agenda, without taking into consideration the conditions for sustainable economic development.

Missing a generation in EU politics. FutureLab Europe, April 2014

The European Union has always struggled to build a strong relation with its electorate and the results of the 2009 European elections showed that turnout is still declining but also significantly lower than in national elections. The percentage of young people that voted in these elections was even lower, with an average of 29% for the age group 18-24 and 36% for the age group 25-36. To investigate this further, FutureLab Europe carried out an online survey, asking young Europeans about their attitude towards the EU and the upcoming EP elections, with the results presented here in the report: ‘Missing a generation in EU politics’.

Svodboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene. OSW Commentary No. 56, 2011-07-04

Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing increase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist movements, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will become a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments controlled by the Svoboda Party.

Cyprus presidency and Turkey's relations with the European Union. OSW Commentary No. 82, 2012-06-26

Turkey’s intention to boycott Cyprus presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2012 is a logical consequence of Ankara’s policy of not recognising the Republic of Cyprus. The boycott will have a negative but limited impact on Turkey-EU relations, and will not in practice significantly affect their intensity in the second half-year. The so-called positive agenda, a new co-operation mechanism between the EU and Turkey, offers a provisional way for the two sides to circumvent the formal obstacle for mutual contacts created by the Cyprus conflict. In itself, however, the launch of the positive agenda is not a breakthrough for Turkey’s integration with the EU. Any such breakthrough is unlikely to occur until progress is made in regulating the Cyprus conflict, and some member states change their attitude towards Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The menace of a 'brown' Russia: Ethnically motivated xenophobia - symptoms, causes and prospects for the future. OSW Study 29/2008

This paper focuses on the ethnic dimension of xenophobia, as understood as aversion, fear or hostility vis-a-vis members of other nationalities, as well as the related radical nationalist ideas founded on the concept of the dominant (and often discriminatory) role of the Russians in the Russian Federation, with reference to racism or neo-Nazism. This text primarily presents xenophobia as an enormous social problem in today's Russia, which is not being addressed at the moment, but is instead being exploited by both the authorities and radical nationalist groups. This paper attempts to describe and understand the causes of xenophobia and the reasons for the popularity of extremely nationalist views among ethnic Russians. It also seeks to estimate the scale of the problem and the potential threat it may create in the future. The first part describes the different manifestations of xenophobia in present-day Russia. It identifies the groups most exposed to ethnically motivated violence and persecution, as well as the most xenophobic communities, and discusses the scale of the problem and its specific characteristics in the context of Russian reality. The second part looks into the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments among Russians, while the last chapters delve into the authorities' attitude towards the problem and seek to answer the question of whether radical nationalist ideas may in future come to dominate Russia's political scene.

Could Transnistria block Moldova's integration with the EU? OSW Commentary No. 95, 2012-10-23

Moldova’s progress in its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the European Union, with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its key element, has become a source of tension between Chisinau and the breakaway Republic of Transnistria. An almost certain refusal by Transnistria to join the DCFTA, will deprive the region of the benefits it currently enjoys under the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) worsening its already precarious economic situation. It is to be expected that the issue will become an additional source of tension between the two sides of the Transnistrian conflict, and might also have a negative impact on the EU–Russia relationship. The signing of the Association Agreement, which is scheduled for the autumn of 2013, will be an important step towards Moldova’s integration with the EU. Both sides assign great importance to the speediest possible finalisation of the Agreement, and so far the negotiations have been described as progressing very smoothly. Transnistria’s highly sceptical attitude towards its possible accession to the DCFTA, however, is consistent with the interests of its main ally, Moscow. It is highly probable that Russia intends to thwart Moldova’s EU association process. Moscow’s objective seems to be to draw Moldova permanently into its own sphere of influence, and therefore it perceives Chisinau’s movement towards the EU as a transgression against its geopolitical interests. Consequently, in order to hinder this process, Russia may instrumentally exploit its extensive influence over Transnistria to provoke a crisis between Tiraspol and Chisinau. An apparent increase in Russian presence in the region over the last few months (including tighter control over Transnistria’s KGB and the Ministry of Information) may suggest that the Kremlin is preparing to implement such a scenario.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Shale gas in Europe: much ado about little? Egmont Paper No. 64, March 2014

Introduction. Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas part in the world’s energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled “Are we entering a golden age of gas?” This report suggests that shale gas could help substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in the global temperature to 2° C above pre-industrial levels. In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploitation remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States’ attitude seems to vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue appears quite divided everywhere. This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU (§ 1), the potential costs and benefits (§ 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions (§ 3) and the national authorities (§ 4), and finally the emerging EU framework (§ 5). The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and energy.4

European Monetary Union: between the stakeholder and the stockholder models of capitalism. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 01.3, 2001

From the mid-1980s on a new attitude towards self-determination appeared in Western European integration. With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and, later, with theAmsterdam Treaty of 1997 the member countries of the European Community manifested their determination to be active players in the new international order. Accepting and instituting the single market and monetary union constituted, however, a challenge of compatibility between the traditional model of welfare European capitalism and the impositions coming from globalization under the neo-liberal model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. This issue is examined here under two perspectives. The first reviews the implications which globalization has had on the European model of capitalism and the second the complications for monetary management as Europe moves from a nationally regulated to a union regulated financial structure.

An essential partner in the background. Europe in China's policy during the rule of Xi Jinping. OSW STUDIES 56 2016

Chinese elites do not treat Europe as an equal partner and are convinced that China holds the upper hand over Europe. They see a growing asymmetry in bilateral relations. China’s sense of its own potential is boosted by internal divisions within the European Union. At the same time, Europe is China’s key economic partner and an ‘economic pillar’ supporting China’s growth on the international stage. Beijing strives to maintain Europe’s open attitude towards the Chinese economy, in particular its exports, technology transfer to China, location of investments and diversification of China’s currency reserves. Cooperation with Europe and support from Europe are necessary to enable China to improve its position in the international economic and financial system, mainly in order to legitimise China’s actions in the area of multilateralism and global governance. Similarly, Beijing attaches great importance to maintaining Europe’s non-involvement in two issues: China’s core interests and Chinese-American relations.