A Greek tragedy in the making. EPC Commentary, 6 July 2015

One thing is clear: the Greek people have emphatically voted ‘No’, providing a boost to Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and plunging Greece and the Eurozone even more into uncertainty. But it might, at the end of the day, prove to be a hollow victory for the Greek Prime Minister: the vote cannot compel the rest of the Eurozone to open their coffers and provide the funds Greece so desperately needs. It is certainly not a victory for democracy: it is highly questionable whether the Greek people could form an informed opinion, given the short time frame, the unclear question relying on a proposal no longer on the table, and the high level of misinformation on the potential consequences of the vote. This is no victory, neither for Greece nor the EU and its members: in the end, it increases the danger of Greece leaving the Eurozone – and potentially even an eventual exit from the EU –, which the people of Greece clearly do not want, as 75-80 per cent of citizens firmly want the country to stay in the euro.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

A Crisis for the Ages: The European Union and the migration Crisis. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 Special, October 2015

Five months ago most European citizens were unaware of the number of refugees seeking to reach the richest EU Member States like Germany, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The first wake up call for Europe was after the Lampedusa tragedy costing the lives of more than 300 refugees on October 3rd, 2013.1 Europeans were shocked, as the world was, to wake up to hear about such tragedy taking place at their doorstep. From 2013 to 2015, the issue of mass-migration from Syria, Eritrea, Somalia and other countries in the region left the front pages of newspapers and the minds of Europeans, but had remained extremely present in the world of experts and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was calling for actions. The second wake-up call, which marked the beginning of the seriousness of the crisis, was the shipwreck where an estimated 900 migrants died on April 19th, 2015 off the coast of Italy.