Greece back on centre stage: the results of a déjà vu summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 23 March 2015

The March 2015 European Council might not enter history books, but the outcome of an informal ‘mini summit’ between seven EU leaders has the potential to prepare the grounds for a breakthrough in the negotiations between Athens and its lenders. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the search for a compromise promises to be a cumbersome, time-consuming and nerveracking exercise. But a solution now seems possible, proving all those doomsayers who have been predicting a ‘Grexit’ or ‘Graccident’ wrong. On other topics, EU leaders committed their countries to build an Energy Union, although questions remain about whether member states will agree to cede sovereignty on a number of significant points. This analysis looks also at the economic issues dealt with at the Spring Summit, with a focus on the perspectives for the European Semester and the Juncker Investment Plan. It ends with a summary of decisions taken on a number of other topics, including relations with Russia and Ukraine, the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, developments in Libya and in Tunisia, and the endorsement of the Council’s new Secretary General.

Post-Summit Commentary – Greece on the brink. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2015

The developments of recent days have been dramatic – the saga of the Greek crisis has probably opened its decisive chapter. Negotiations between Athens and its creditors failed after the Greek government decided to leave the negotiating table and hold a referendum on 5 July. The future of the country in the common currency and the potential consequences for the EU and the euro are uncertain. There are clear signs of fatigue, everywhere. But there is still time to avert the worst, if there is the political will on all sides to work on a new perspective for Greece and for the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Poland and Greece - two contrasting EU enlargement experiences. ZEI Discussion Paper C213, 2012

The aim of this contribution is a comparative analysis of the challenges Poland and Greece (and more broadly – CEE-10 and GIPS countries) had to face in the past as latecomers to the European Union and are facing now, in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. The main underlying message conveyed in this text is two-fold. Firstly, the author is going to argue that the breadth and complexity of the challenges Poland and other CEE-10 countries had to face while entering the road of systemic transformation was by far greater compared to past and in particular – current problems of Greece (and the remaining GIPS countries) in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. Secondly, a resilience of Poland and other CEE-10 economies, relative to Greece and other GIPS, to the recent crisis was due to a comparatively higher level of institutional development of the former group at the time of their EU accession and at present. The ensuing discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 below provides comparative background information on the two reference groups. In Section 3 we discuss the most salient features of the design of the command economy and its legacy, as a key determinant of the initial conditions of systemic transformation. Next, in Section 4 we overview the basic indicators of growth performance and institutional reforms in CEE-10 countries between 1990 and 2011. Section 5 offers a picture of economic growth and real economic convergence in Greece and the remaining GIPS countries. In Section 6 we embark on comparative analysis of the institutional quality of Greece and Poland against a broader background of GIPS, CEE-10 and the remaining EU member countries. Section 7 concludes with a summary of major findings.

Greece and the European Agenda: EU Enlargement and European Monetary Union. Program for the Study of Germany & Europe Working Paper 8.2

In the decade to come, the European Union will embark on two new projects, each destined to transform it in fundamental ways: (i) Eastern enlargement, and (ii) economic and monetary union. Neither of these projects will affect all members equally or in the same way. But Greece will, for two reasons, be affected in a manner qualitatively different to all other member states. First, Greece is the only country physically affected by the Luxembourg Summit's decision to begin accession negotiations with some, but not all, Central and Eastern European applicant countries: as a result of this decision, she will continue, for at least another eight to ten years, to be the only member country not to share a common border with another member state, with all the consequent implications in economic and geostrategic tenns. Second, when the European Council meets in early May to select those member states that are deemed to have met the convergence criteria, it will find that Greece is the only member state falling short of those criteria. This development may create additional difficulties for her economy during the transitional period of derogation. It will also pose new risks to Greece, insofar as she will be absent during the initial-and crucial-years of establishing a common monetary policy.