Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation, Part II. OSW Report, July 2008

The Centre for Eastern Studies has decided to embark on the project entitled 'Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation' for two major reasons: the start of the accession negotiations between Ankara and the European Union in October 2005, and the significant part which Turkey plays in western Eurasia (the Caucasus, the countries in the basins of the Black and Caspian Seas, the Middle East and the Balkans) which We wish to present our readers our second report discussing Turkey's relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia, the aspect of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Black Sea, and the role of Turkey as a transit country for oil and gas from the Middle East and the Caspian regions. The evaluation of Turkey's standpoint and potential regarding the aforementioned issues is especially important, considering the tensions existing in Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA, as well as the West's increasing engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea regions. In this process, Ankara may play the role of a significant ally for the West. However, it may just as readily play the role of its rival, who could co-operate with other countries and may seriously frustrate the implementation of the EU and US' goals. The Report was developed between autumn 2006 and autumn 2007, over which time the project participants searched for publicly available documents in Poland, Turkey, EU countries and the USA, and went on five research trips to Central Asia, Russia, Turkey and Caucasus, where they met local analysts, officials and researchers.

Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation, Part I. OSW Report, June 2007

The start of accession negotiations between Ankara and the EU is vital for the future of both Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its member state, as well as for the geopolitical situation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appreciating the significance of these issues, the Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided to launch a project entitled "Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation". The goal of this project is to present, within the context of accession negotiations, Turkey's greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara's relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and the USA. This Report is the first of three which will be published as part of the project. The Report includes texts on Turkish-US relations since 2003, major political and social challenges on Turkey's path towards the EU and the current condition of the Turkish economy. The Report was developed between July 2005 and November 2006, over which time CES workers and associates searched for publicly available materials in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on three research trips to Turkey, where they met local researchers, analysts, politicians and officials. The authors of the Report would like to express their gratitude to everyone who have shared their opinions with them, and to the Polish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassador Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej Ananicz for their expert support and assistance in the authors' work on this Report. This Report does not present the official stance of the Polish government on the issues discussed therein; instead it reflects the personal views of its authors, who have made their best efforts to ensure that their work is reliable.

Spain: foreign relations and policy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 2, August 2012

From the Introduction. The subject of the position of Spain in the world (through history, recent times, and today) has been described by scholars and casual observers by a combination of qualifiers. It is considered paradoxical, unique and influential, riddled with isolation and ambition, resulting in frustration and success. In any event, Spain’s record in modern times has to be considered as below its potential in historical terms, geographical position, culture and world presence through migration and the results of the empire. In any way, Spain deserves to be included among one of about twenty five countries that, for one reason or another, play a role in the overall current global panorama. 1

Does ASEM work? CEPS Policy Brief No. 321, 14 October 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief is based on a larger study for the EEAS and European Commission, written by the same authors in the run-up of the Milan ASEM summit of 16-17 October 2014. The main idea of the study is to assess whether ASEM works and how, by verifying the factual evidence in detail. After all, ASEM has no institutions, no budget and no treaty, whilst dialogues and a loose improvement over time in Asia-Europe relations refer to process much more than genuine ‘results’. The stocktaking covers all ASEM activities since the 2006 Helsinki summit. Summit and foreign ministers’ declarations and ASEM calendar of activities (and interviews) are used to trace ASEM activities in the three ASEM pillars (political, economic, and peoples-to-peoples/cultural). All the ‘regular’ ASEM meetings at ministerial and other levels (many of which are only known to relatively few) have been mapped. Also the ASEM working methods, based on the 2000 AECF framework and many subsequent initiatives, have been scrutinised, including whether they are actually implemented or not or partially. Such methods refer to how to work together in areas of cooperation (beyond the typical ASEM dialogue), organisation, coordination and ASEM visibility. The main conclusion is that ASEM works reasonably well, once one accepts the ASEM of today, although some inefficiencies still characterise the ‘system’. There is a host of secondary conclusions on the three pillars, the foreign ministers, the strong government-to-government nature of ASEM and the working methods. We recommend that today’s ASEM needs no reform and that not having ASEM would entail political and diplomatic costs. We emphasise that ASEM is well placed to stimulate exchange of information between the mega-FTAs such as TPP, RCEP and TTIP. However, the ASEM of tomorrow might be different, given the great changes in geo-political and economic conditions since ASEM began in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the size of ASEM has become such that classical ways of operating with (after Milano) 53 countries (including the EU and ASEAN) cannot possibly be effective all the time. We suggest that, in the run-up to the 20th ASEM birthday (2016), EU and Asian independent think-tanks get together to write an ‘options report’ reconsidering options for a new ASEM, as the basis for a profound and wide debate how to get more value-added out of ASEM.

Belarus 2006. OSW Report, January 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006. Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

Tunisia. Supervising Tunisian Elections by civil society: How to improve it? Arab Citizenship Review No. 7. January 2015

Introduction. On October 26, 2014, Tunisia held its second democratic legislative elections. Participation among more than 5 million registered voters was at about 60%, a relatively good turnout for the country, compared to the 52% voters in 2011. Preliminary results for the 33 constituencies (27 within the country and 6 for expatriates) reveal that secular frontrunner Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) won around 37% percent of votes while moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, winner of the 2011 elections and leader of Tunisia’s post-revolution government, received 27% of votes. Other parties with notable percentages are the Free Patriotic Union (French: UPL) with 4.4% and the leftist party, Popular Front, with 3.7%. Legislative were immediately followed by two round presidential elections the first one held on November 23, the second one after one month. Conversely to what was expected, people were more attracted by presidential elections even though president has notably less prerogatives than the parliament: representing the state, he is mainly responsible for determining the general state policies in the domains of defense, foreign relations and national security (article 76.) This paradox is ascribed to national imaginary more confident in a “Zaïm” (leader) rather than a collective institution such as a parliament. The turnout was at about 64% within the national 27 constituencies. Out of 70 candidates (including 5 female), 27 (with only one female) met the legal requirements to run for the presidency. The result confirms the legislative trend and Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Nidaa, was proclaimed the third President of Tunisia. He gained 39.46% of the votes at the first round elections. Essebsi was followed by Moncef Marzouki who received an unexpected score (33.43%) at the first round, thanks to the support of Ennahdha audience and to an active and insistent campaign focused on the idea that revolution is threatened by old regime guard “come-back.” Rewarded for his long militant live, the extreme leftist Hamma Hammami in a new look gained 7,8% of the votes while the new comer Slim Riahi received 5,5% despite rumors circulating on his personal reputation. Notably, Kalthoum Kennou gained 0,55% (18.287 votes) but listed eleventh out of 27.

Ukraine and the European Union: Time for a Re-Think. ACES Working Papers, 2011

There are two reasons for the virtual nature of the West’s dialogue with Ukraine. The first is institutional as the EU has until now only been willing to use ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in ‘enlargement-heavy’ (i.e. full membership) whereas it has only used ‘carrots,’ but never ‘sticks’, in ‘enlargement-light’ (i.e. the DCFTA). European Council Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson argue that the EU should be more willing to use both carrots and sticks; that is integrating its soft and hard power. The second is a disconnection between the West and Kyiv over definitions of democracy. The Ukrainian authorities have until now wanted to have their cake and eat it, too; rolling back democracy in Kyiv while claiming to sign up to ‘European values’ in Brussels.

Don’t Go Protectionist! Trade and Investment Relations between the EU and China. Asia Policy Brief 2012/1, June 2012

The European Parliament has proposed the creation of a body to monitor foreign – in particular Chinese – investment in the EU. The initiative, driven by fears of unfair competition and a hidden political agenda behind Chinese investments, should be rejected. There are better ways to promote openness and transparency in Sino-European economic relations.

Why EU promotion is at odds with successful crisis management: public relations, news coverage, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 10, September 2012

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can be tools used to increase the international profile of the European Union. Nevertheless, CSDP missions garner little news coverage. This article argues that the very nature of the missions themselves makes them poor vehicles for EU promotion for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. By definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making news coverage politically sensitive. The very act of reporting could undermine the mission. Institutionally, all CSDP missions are intergovernmental, making press statements slow, overly bureaucratic, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, the missions are often located in remote, undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international journalists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. Using the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as a case study, the author concludes that although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the political function of raising the profile of the EU.

The International Conference Education and Creativity for a Knowledge–based Society – Social and Political Scinces, Communication, Foreign Languages and Public Relations. Vienna, Osterreichish Rumanischer Akademischer Verein, 2012. VIth edition

No abstract.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6